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Quasi-Rationality in Action: A Study Of
Psychological Factors in Merger Decision-Making
JAMES A. FANTO*
This article shows how recent behavioral and psychological literature is useful
for understanding merger decision-making by conducting a psychologically-
oriented empirical study that reveals the presence ofpsychological motivations
orfactors in mega-merger decision-making. The data set is the ten largest stock-
for-stock mega-mergers for each of the last three years-the heyday of the mega-
mergers. It first situates the article in an ongoing study of the mega-merger
"wave" and presents the necessary behavioral and psychological background to
the empirical study. It next describes the method of the study, which involves
creating a "'grid" of psychological factors and applying it to public
representations of decisions by the boards of the mergingfirms in the data set, in
order to detect the presence of the factors in this decision-making. It then
presents the results of the empirical study and offers a narrative explanation of
them. To reinforce the shareholder value destruction in the mega-mergers, the
article also provides evidence of value loss in the thirty mega-mergers. Finally, it
discusses the implications of the empirical study for corporate and securities law
relating to mega-merger decision-making. Here it finds that courts and policy-
makers accept a psychologically simplistic view of this decision-making by both
boards of directors and shareholders. It also argues that both corporate law and
federal securities laws require reform so that regulators and courts can address
the influence of psychological factors in merger decision-making. The article
concludes by offering examples ofpossible legal reform.
I would take issue with the idea that most mergers end up being failures. I
know there are studies from the 1970s and '80s that will tell you that But when I
look at many companies today-particularly new-economy companies like
Cisco and WorldCom-I have a hard time dismissing the strategic power of
M&A.
-Alex Mandl, Chairman and CEO of Teligent.**
Professor, Brooklyn Law School. I thank Philip Lindenbaum for his research assistance,
Jeffrey Rachlinski and Daniel Greenwood for valuable comments on an earlier draft Dean Joan
Wexler for a summer stipend and one-semester sabbatical, and Larry Mitchell for his invitation
to the Summer 2000 Sloan Program for the Study of Business in Society, sponsored by the
George Washington University Law School, which inspired the article. © 2001 by James A.
Fanto. All rights reserved.
** Dennis Carey (moderator), Lessons From Master Acquirers: A CEO Roundtable on
Making Mergers Succeed, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 2000, at 145,146.
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Most academic studies of mergers argue that a majority of mergers are not
beneficial to the acquiring company ... The overwhelming majority of
negotiated strategic mergers that I have been involved in over a 45-year period
were successful for the acquiring company.
-Martin Lipton, renowned takeover lawyer.***
Even factually informed people tend to think that risks are less likely to
materialize for themselves than for others.
-Professor Cass Sunstein
(referring to psychological literature on optimism and self-serving bias).
I. JNTRODUCTION
By all accounts, the stock-for-stock mega-merger is the kind of transaction
that characterized the 1990s and continues to mark the first decade of the new
millennium The examples of this kind of transaction, where two enormous
publicly owned firms combine or, in legal parlance, "merge" through an
exchange of their stock, are thus numerous during the recent past. One exemplary
mega-merger that comes to mind is the largest to date-the combination of the
Internet firm America Online and the entertainment conglomerate Time Warner.2
Although concentrated in telecommunications, financial services, and oil, the
transactions have also occurred in other industries.
3
Unfortunately, the success record of the current mega-mergers, like so many
predecessor transactions, is poor. Available data suggest that the transactions
***Martin Lipton, Mergers: Past, Present and Future 10 (Jan. 10, 2001) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
**** Cass R. Sunstein, BehavioralAnalysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1183 (1997).
1 A mega-merger is generally understood to mean a merger of large firms where the
acquiring and acquired or target firm are of comparable size. See Richard T. Bliss & Richard J.
Rosen, CEO Compensation and Bank Mergers 9 (Feb. 2000) (unpublished manuscript), at
http'//papers.ssm.com (May 28, 2000) (defining bank mega-merger as an acquisition "where
the total assets of the target bank immediately before the merger announcement are at least ten
percent of the acquirer's pre-merger assets and where the target is not a failed bank'); Edward J.
Kane, Incentives for Banking Mega-Mergers: What Motives Might Regulators Infer from
Event-Study Evidence? 20 (Jan. 25, 2000) (unpublished manuscript), at
http'//papers.ssm.comlsol3 (Mar. 3, 2000) (defining bank mega-merger as transaction involving
one of the largest bank holding companies that increases its pro-forma size or market
capitalization by at least one-half the amount of assets shown for the twelfth largest bank
holding company).2 See Martin Peers et al., AOL, Time Warner Leap Borders to Plan a Mammoth Merger,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2000, at Al.
3 See infra Part V.D.
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destroy, and will continue to destroy, value for shareholders of the combined firm.
The new firm will simply underperform comparable firms that have not engaged
in a similar mega-transaction. This value destruction often arises because the firm
fails to achieve the economies of scale or scope4 and other "synergies 's that it
promised and because nimble competitors take advantage of the new firm's
efforts to bring its two parts together in order to erode its position in its product
markets.
It is therefore not surprising that business and finance scholars study and try
to explain the persistence of these value-destroying transactions. One popular
explanation focuses on the psychological reasons for the deals. According to this
account, chief executive officers (CEOs) of acquiring firms are both over-
optimistic and, in many cases, hubristic in proposing and affecting the mega-
transactions.6 Ignoring past evidence of the probable failure of this kind of
transaction and even the combination difficulties facing them in the proposed
deal, top executives nevertheless believe that their transaction will be the
exception to the rule and they single-mindedly push forward to implement it.
Indeed, in their desire to ensure that the combination is effected, they often "bid
up" the price of the target so high as to lower even more the chance of success of
the merger.
It is now appropriate to move beyond the psychological explanations for
destructive mergers offered in these early studies. The simple reason is that, in
recent years, there has been considerable development in psychological and
behavioral studies on decision-making. The rich academic literature that has
emerged and that is now influencing legal studies suggests complex
psychological motivations for the transactions besides managerial hubris.7 For
example, although the overconfidence of CEOs no doubt plays a large part in the
decision-making on the transaction and is likely to be particularly present in a
mega-merger, a merger will often also be motivated by a strong fear on the part of
both firms' managers and board members of losing the firms' respective
competitive positions-i.e., of losing their "status quo." In behavioral terms, this
4 See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICs OF INDUSTRIAL
CAPrrALISM 17 (1990) (defining scale economies as "those that result when the increased size
of a single operating unit producing or distributing a single product reduces the unit cost of
production or distribudon" and scope economies as "those resulting from the use of processes
within a single operating unit to produce or distribute more than one product").
'MARK L. SIROWER, THE SYNERGY TRAP: How COMPANIES LOSE THE ACQUISITON
GAME 6 (1997) (defining synergy as an "increase in competitiveness and resulting cash flows
beyond what the two companies are expected to accomplish independently").
6For the classic discussion of this problem in mergers, see Richard Roll, The Hubris
Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. Bus. 197 (1986). See generally Bernard Black,
Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597 (1989) (providing an early summary
of the psychological literature).
7See infra Part m.
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fear reflects the presence of a "status quo" bias.8
This article proposes to show how recent behavioral and psychological
literature would be useful for understanding merger decision-making by
conducting a psychologically-oriented empirical study, but not a psychologically-
controlled experiment,9 that reveals the presence of psychological motivations or
factors in the mega-merger decision process. It uses thirty total transactions--the
ten largest announced stock-for-stock mega-mergers in 1998, 1999, and 2000.
The article examines the justifications for the transactions that the combining
firms offer in public documents that are credible representations of board
decision-making and to which legal liability attaches. These documents include
press releases announcing the transactions and combined registration and proxy
statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in which
both firms seek shareholder approval of the merger and the acquiring firm
registers the shares used in the share exchange. In particular, the examination of
this data is designed to detect the existence or nonexistence of behavioral and
psychological factors that might have motivated decision-making in the mega-
mergers.
This article does not end with presenting its empirical findings, even though
by themselves they are significant for the light that they shed on decision-making
in the recent mega-mergers. It discusses the findings in relation to the corporate
law and federal securities law governing merger decision-making. Under this law,
courts and governmental authorities, like the SEC, presume that merger decision-
making is essentially a rational process limited generally to information
processing, and they rarely intrude upon or question it provided that there are
appropriate indicia of rationality in the process. If, however, behavioral and
psychological factors are found to figure so prominently in merger decision-
making, even when the process otherwise appears rational, the law's approach to
regulating this process is seriously flawed. This approach is particularly troubling,
moreover, if there is any empirical evidence-some of which the article
provides-that the exercise of the factors correlates with value-destroying
mergers. The empirical findings of the article thus suggest that both corporate and
securities law need to be reformulated to take account of the reality of merger
decision-making, and the article offers some examples of this reformulation.
The article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly situates the article in an
ongoing study of the mega-merger "wave" and of the value destruction resulting
from the stock-for-stock mega-mergers. Part II presents the necessary behavioral
and psychological background of the empirical study. It first refers to the previous
8iad
9Typical psychologically-controlled experiments often involve studies that use college
students (or others) as subjects in order to attempt scientifically to isolate behavioral effects.
See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Matthew L. Spitzer & Eric L. Talley, Endowment Effects, Other-




psychological explanations for problems in mergers and then surveys the
contributions of recent psychological and behavioral studies that are particularly
relevant for understanding merger decision-making. This survey sets forth the
motivations, biases, and heuristics (shortcut ways of thinking) that make up the
psychological factors common in decision-making.
Part IV presents the empirical study's method and database. It explains why
the empirical approach was selected over alternative approaches and justifies the
reliability of the chosen method. It next describes this method and the data set of
the empirical study. The study creates a "grid" of the psychological factors and
then applies it to public representations of decisions by the boards of the merging
firms in thirty announced stock-for-stock mega-mergers, in which they discuss
their reasons for the mergers and ask shareholders to support their merger
proposal, in order to detect the presence of the factors in this decision-making.
This part also answers possible objections to the method. Part V presents four
tables with the results of the empirical study and then offers a narrative
explanation of the results. To show that, like the typical merger, these mega-
mergers generally destroy shareholder value, this part then presents evidence of
loss of shareholder value in the thirty mega-mergers. It concludes by discussing
the suggestive, but inconclusive, evidence establishing a causal relation between
the psychological factors and this value destruction in the relevant mega-mergers.
Finally, Part VI discusses the implications of the empirical study for
corporate and securities law relating to mega-merger decision-making. It first
examines how courts, in applying this law, account for the presence of the
psychological factors in this process. It finds, in fact, that they accept a
psychologically simplistic view of merger decision-making by both boards of
directors and shareholders. It then questions efforts by legal scholars to suggest
that this simplistic judicial view actually masks a more sophisticated legal
awareness of and accommodation with psychology in merger decision-making.
Second, Part VI argues that both corporate and securities law require reform so
that regulators and courts can address the influence of psychological factors in
merger decision-making. It offers several examples of possible reform, such as a
proposal that both SEC disclosure rules and Delaware's corporate law duty of
disclosure be enhanced to encourage boards of companies proposing a mega-
merger to engage in certain decision-making steps that could help counter the
influence of the psychological factors, and a related proposal requiring more
disclosure from investment banks delivering fairness opinions in the transactions.
Part VI also suggests that a particularly useful reform would be for courts to
accord less deference to boards in merger decision-making and argues that this
reform might follow from courts increasing their awareness of the role of the
psychological factors in decision-making. Part VII concludes that the article's
study demonstrates the forceful presence of psychological factors in merger
decision-making.
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I. AN ONGOING STUDY OF IEGA-MERGERS
This article is the second in a series of studies of merger decision-making
with a focus on mega-mergers. The first article discussed how the mega-merger is
the emblematic transaction of the 1990s and early 2000s and identified both the
anecdotal and scientific evidence of the destruction of shareholder value in these
transactions.1°
There is no reason to revisit the issues discussed in this earlier article,
particularly the available evidence of value destruction from the mega-mergers.
Rather, it is important here only to emphasize a few points made in that article,
which are critical to this article's empirical study, and to situate the study as part
of a larger, ongoing project. First, as the term is used here and in the previous
article, mega-merger means a combination of some of the largest firms in a given
industry, where the target is of comparable size to the acquirer. The legal form of
the transaction, moreover, is usually a merger of the target firm with a subsidiary
of the acquirer where the shareholders of the target receive acquirer stock and the
target firm becomes an acquirer subsidiary, the classic reverse triangular merger."
Under corporate law (and sometimes under stock exchange rules), the board of
each firm must approve the transaction and, in most cases, must seek shareholder
approval for it.'2 Very often the combination is presented as a "merger of equals,"
which means that, from the perspective of both firms, the transaction is almost a
partnership. Not only do the assets, liabilities, and employees of the firms
combine, but also do those groups who are the focus of corporate govemance-
the CEOs, board members, and shareholders.
Second, neither this article nor its predecessor is intended to deny that CEOs,
board members, and their advisors have organizational and industrial
justifications for and rational strategies relating to mergers.' 3 The literature on
'
0See James A. Fanto, Braking the Merger Momentum: Reforming Corporate Lmv
Governing Mega-Mergers, 49 BUFFALO L. REv. 249, 251, 256-57 (2001). The article then
offered several explanations for these transactions, particularly highlighting the psychological
pressures that push CEOs to propose, and boards of directors, shareholders, and financial
professionals to go along with, the transactions; the absence of political pressure on decision-
makers; corporate law jurisprudence that promotes this kind of merger as a preferred altemative
to the leveraged buy-outs (LBOs) of financial raiders of the 1980s; and corporate practice that
hinders "rethinking" of the transaction once boards have agreed to it. The article finally argued
for a reform to Delaware corporate law that would encourage boards to resist the "momentum"
of a mega-merger by having courts impose an enhanced fiduciary duty upon them when the
boards are evaluating this kind of transaction.
" See RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONs 670-71 (1995) (describing transaction structure).
12See WILLIAM J. CARNEY, MERGERS AND ACQUIsrITONS 714-16 (2000) (discussing some
basics of shareholder voting in triangular mergers).
"However, these justifications and strategies are not above criticism on their own
economic and financial terms. See, e.g., RICARDO J. CABBALLERO & MOHAMMAD L.
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mergers, including mega-mergers, in the business, organizational, economic, and
finance disciplines is extensive and is devoted to explaining both rational reasons
for the occurrence of these transactions and rational ways of improving them.
14
The literature even identifies instances when the exercise of this kind of
rationality in merger decision-making can be characterized as "perverse"for
example, CEOs engage in mergers primarily to increase their own compensation
or perquisites, a rational, self-interested goal.' 5
Third (and this is the central point of the ongoing research project), the
persistence of value problems in mergers, particularly in the mega-mergers,
suggests that calculative rationality may not tell the whole story about merger
HAMMOUR, INSTITUTIONs, RESrRUCruRING, AND MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 30-31
(MIT Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. 00-02, 2000), at http'//papers.nber.org/papers/w7720
(last visited Aug. 29, 2001) (explaining that most merger and acquisition activity involving
restructuring has occurred when stock prices are high because sellers are encouraged by this
liquidity to sell their firms); NAM-HOON KANG & SARA JOHANssON, CROSS-BORDER MERGERS
AND ACQUIsITIONs: THEIR ROLE IN INDUSTRIAL GLOBALISATION 30-33 (OECD STI, Working
Paper No. 2000/1, 2000), at http://www.oecd.orgfdsti/sti/prod/wp200_Le.htm (last modified Jan.
10, 2000) (explaining industrial, firm-level, technological, and governmental reasons for cross-
border mergers); RAGHURAM G. RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES, THE GOVERNANCE OF THE NEW
ENTERPRISE 26-27 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7958, 2000), at
http'J/papers.nbder.org/papers/w7958 (last visited Aug. 29, 2001) (discussing recent merger
wave in "human capital" terms); Vojislav Maksimovic & Gordon M. Phillips, The Market for
Corporate Assets: Who Engages in Mergers and Asset Sales and are there Efficiency Gains? 29
(Nov. 20, 2000) (unpublished manuscript), at http'//papers.ssm.com/sol3/ papers.ctm (Mar. 16,
2000) (finding that mergers tend to occur when there is a positive "demand shock" to an
industry and assets and firms subsequently are purchased by the best users). But see Pankaj
Ghemawat & Faribfrz Ghadar, The Dubious Logic of Global Megamergers, HARV. Bus. REV.,
July--August 2000, &f 63, 65 (strongly questioning the economic rationale for global mega-
mergers and pointing out that concentration in industries has actually declined over the past fifty
years); Allen N. Berger et al., Globalization of Financial Institutions: Evidence from Cross-
Border Banking Performance, 3 BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FIN. SERvICES 47-50
(2000) (reviewing in detail the reason for cross-border mergers of financial institutions and
finding that domestic banks are generally more efficient than foreign banks, except banks from
the United States, which calls into question the absolute logic of cross-border mega-transactions
in financial services); Kane, supra note 1, at 20-23 (explaining results from event studies
showing post-announcement gains in value from bank mega-mergers-based on total of stock
market gains from each firm on day of announcement-may be due to perceived advantages
from a bank's achieving market power and "too big to fail" status, rather than to expectation of
achievement of the promised synergies).
14 See, e.g., Shaker A. Zahra & Sherry S. Chaples, Blind Spots in Competitive Analysis, 7
ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 7 (1993) (discussing common flaws in executives' analysis of
competitors, but also focusing on executives' psychological and cognitive limitations).
'
5See, e.g., Jay Hartzell et al., What's in It for Me? Personal Benefits Obtained by CEOs
Whose Finns Are Acquired 10-12, 14-16 (March 2000) (unpublished manuscript), at
http'//papers.ssm.comsol3/papers.cfin (July 24, 2000) (presenting data showing that target
CEOs extract wealth gains from the acquirer in return for agreeing to allow their firms to
merge, with such gains being lower when the CEO obtains a position with acquirer).
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decision-making. That is, the frequent, spectacular failures in mergers may well
point to something other than a problem in rational decision-making. A
problematic merger, for example, may not result from the failure of decision-
makers to process particular information or to carry on their deliberations long
enough, or from their understandable, all-too-human inability to foresee particular
consequences. Rather, problems with mergers could arise from the exercise of
psychological factors in the decision-makers that invariably and repeatedly cause
them to react to, and to understand, information in given ways or to overlook
completely information that does not support their chosen path.' 6
There is growing evidence that even in human activities like merger decision-
making, where people are understood generally to exhibit rational behavior,
people often think and behave not entirely in a rational manner. They do not act
irrationally, but they act quasi-rationally.17 My earlier article emphasized how the
prevalence of the mega-mergers owed much to psychological momentum as
CEOs felt pressure to imitate competitors doing large transactions, boards felt
compelled to follow persuasive CEOs who had a good acquisition track record,
and financial professionals and investors went along with the momentum that the
business press promoted and politicians did not oppose.18 The purpose of this
article is to conduct an empirical study that helps unpack and identify the specific
psychological factors that contribute to the momentum and affect merger
decision-making and to consider the implications of the findings for the view of
merger decision-making found in the law. A full justification for and explanation
of the empirical study require a review of the relevant behavioral and
psychological literature.
16A related issue, but one not addressed in this article, is how psychological issues may
"make or break" the success of a merger. See, e.g., MAURIzio ZOLLO & DaIA LESHCHINKSKI,
CAN FIRMS LEARN TO ACQUIRE? Do MARKETS NOTICE? 24 (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr., Working
Paper No. 00-01, 2000), at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/wfic/papers (last visited Aug. 29,
2001) (discussing how an acquirer's elimination of senior management in a target firm destroys
value in the combined firm "due to the non-cooperative or even antagonistic environment
which is typically established as a consequence of the perception of unfair decision-making in
the integration phase").
17See RICHARD H. THALER, QuASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS xxi (1991) ("Quasi rational
behavior exists, and it matters. In some well-defined situations, people make decisions that are
systematically and substantively different from those predicted by the standard economic
model.").
8 One way in which a merger "wave" can destroy value is subtle. In essence, the wave has
a "contagion" effect: the merger of one firm in tum provokes other transactions as firms
scramble to keep up with one another. As a result, there is a kind of arms race to do these
destructive transactions. Cf ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER: WHY MONEY FAILS TO
SATISFY IN AN ERA OF EXCESS 122-45 (1999) (discussing studies explaining why human
behavior is highly influenced by an individual's understanding of his or her relative position in
society and thus by the actions of others).
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II. A REVIEW OF THE BEHAVIORAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE
In one attempt to explain the value destruction caused by mergers,
particularly those of the conglomerate merger wave that occurred after World
War II, legal and finance scholars turned to psychology. Finance scholar Richard
Roll offered the classic explanation: CEOs are simply overconfident and hubristic
regarding the transactions.' 9 They thus propose and complete mergers without
even seeing, or accepting the probability of, a negative outcome. Related
psychological research on the "winner's curse" has also been used to explain
failed mergers, although usually those resulting from competitive bidding.20
Under this theory, a CEO of an acquiring firm is so eager to do a merger that he
or she loses track of the limited possibility of value creation from the transaction
and overbids for the target, thus assuring that the combination will ultimately fail
to increase shareholder value.
Since the use of this psychological literature to account for mergers, there
have been considerable behavioral and psychological studies of decision-making
and a sustained and growing application of them to situations governed by the
law. It is fair to say that law and psychology (or, more broadly, law and human
cognition) is one of the most fertile areas of current legal and finance research.
Legal scholars are paying more attention to the studies, which brings even more
psychological research and insight into legal discussions. This approach has
expanded across legal studies.21 Moreover, business and financial specialists are
19See supra note 6. Managerial literature on mergers continues this focus on CEO
overconfidence. See, e.g., Bliss & Rosen, supra note 1, at 18-19 (summarizing conclusion that
bank CEOs increase their own compensation from mergers even when shareholders experience
a loss, but offering no conclusion as to whether current bank mega-mergers are worthwhile).
2oSee RICHARD H. THAIER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF
ECONOMC LIFE 50-62 (1992).
21See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1053
(2000) (arguing that principles in behavioral sciences such as sociology and psychology may
revitalize the fading law and economics theory); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of
Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1499, 1506-19 (1998) (reviewing the impact of behavioral psychology on legal literature). This
new trend in legal scholarship is not free from criticism. See Mark Kelman, Behavioral
Economics as Part of a Rhetorical Duet: A Response to Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1577, 1586-91 (1998) (contending that behavioral economics does not offer an
adequate predictive model); Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and
the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1552 (1998) (arguing that behavioral law and economics
scholars overemphasize irrationality and that many behavioral problems can be explained by
rational choice theory and evolutionary biology). But see Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein &
Richard Thaler, Theories and Tropes: A Reply to Posner and Kelman, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1593,
1603-04, 1607-08 (1998) (explaining the scientific foundations of behavioral law and
economics-in response to Posner-and observing-in response to Kelman-that studies have
shown that the approach may result in predictions of behavior); Shira B. Lewin, Economics and
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increasingly exhibiting a behavioral and psychological orientation.Y
These intellectual developments suggest that the application of a behavioral
and psychological approach to merger decision-making may well increase
understanding of this process. For this application, which is the purpose of the
article's empirical study, it is necessary to outline (i) the general purpose of the
behavioral and psychological studies and (ii) the psychological factors whose
existence has been well documented in the literature. The purpose of this new
approach in legal studies is to address problems arising under the dominant law
and economics (L&E) approach. Under this approach, the paradigm of human
decision-making is rational choice: people rationally weigh alternatives with a
dispassionate cost/benefit calculation in making decisions.2
3
Yet this paradigm may well be significantly flawed as a model of human
behavior. Considerable empirical evidence suggests that people often do not
behave in ways predicted by the model. For example, studies show that a person
places more value on an object in his or her possession than what is rationally
justifiable; i.e., he or she refuses to part with the object unless given a value that is
in fact greater than its well-established market value.24 Behavioral and
psychological studies have thus pointed to a need for an account of a person and
individual decision-making different from the rational choice model in order to
explain and to predict how people in fact make decisions and behave.2 This
account of human behavior is critical for legal studies because laws and legal
rules are often designed to affect and modify behavior, and this goal can hardly be
achieved without the best available understanding of the behavior itself.
While it is impossible to do justice to the considerable psychological and
behavioral research, including its applications in law and finance, it is useful to
summarize briefly some of its findings to identify the psychological factors used
in the empirical study. By now, a reader of law reviews can take his or her pick of
articles comprehensively summarizing the literature, and there is little need for
another one.26 The behavioral and psychological account offers a richer
Psychology: Lessons for Our Own Day from the Early Twentieth Century, 34 J. ECON. LIT.
1293, 1295-99 (1996) (discussing the history of economics in the 20th century and its
simultaneous resistance to psychology and interest in psychology at the expense of other social
sciences).
22See generally HOwARD SHEFRN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR: UNDERSTANDING
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING (2000) (general discussion of
behavioral finance); ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000).
23Korobldn & Ulen, supra note 21, at 10-16 (for full explanation of versions of rational
choice theory).
2THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS, supra note 17, at 167-88 (discussing this
phenomenon, which is known as the "endowment effect").
25Jennifer Arlen, Comment, The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1766 (1998).
2See, e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Christine
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description than rational choice theory of the motives for and the process of
human behavior and decision-making, which may help an analyst predict human
behavior and form policies likely to modify and influence it.27 This perspective
understands human behavior as emotional and impulsive, rather than exclusively
rational: by their nature people often focus on the present and the short term (i.e.,
they are "myopic"), exclude the future, and react emotionally to the present.2
Thus, they will often place inappropriate value on a present risk or attraction and
find themselves either too preoccupied with or unable to resist it
29
Other behavioral phenomena deal not so much with an emotive focus on the
present as with limitations on human calculative rationality itself, sometimes
called "bounded rationality."30 Here the difference between the view of human
beings offered by behavioral studies and that of the rational choice model is clear,
for the former points to psychological constraints on rationality. People do not
calculate rationally, but they exhibit various biases that prevent or distort rational
calculation. Human beings react more strongly to losses than to gains (i.e., they
have "loss aversion"). In other words, they have a bias towards the status quo and
become attached to what they have (known as the "endowment effect").31 Under
Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Jolls
et al., supra note 21; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 21; Langevoort, supra note 21; Cass R.
Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Behavioral Analysis]; Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Law and Economics: A Progress Report, I
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 115 (1999) [hereinafter Sunstein, Behavioral Law and Economics]. If
anything, there now may be too many general studies of the behavioral and psychological law
field, and more specific studies in particular legal disciplines are thus needed.
27See Arlen, supra note 25, at 1767 ("Economic analysis can only be improved by
incorporating a richer and more accurate view of human behavior."); Richard H. Thaler, From
Homo Economicus to Homo Sapiens, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 133 (2000) ("My predictions can be
summarized quite easily. I am predicting that Homo Economicus will evolve into Homo
Sapiens.'). This richer description of behavior may be tied to certain "basic" ways of thinking
formed in the evolution of our species. See Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Better than
Rational: Evolutionwy Psychology and the Invisible Hand, 84 AEA PAPERS & PROC. 327,
329-30 (1994) (arguing that the mind evolved in specific ways to respond to situations facing
our evolutionary ancestors). The behavioral perspective may also be more accurate because it
agrees with findings of neurobiology that find considerable fault with the view that only
"calculative' rationality governs human decisions. See ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES'
ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 190-91 (1994) (discussing the biological
basis for reason and decision-making).
2'See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 21, at 1113-26 (discussing the power of visceral
cravings and myopia and focus on sunk costs); Sunstein, Behavioral Law and Economics,
supra note 26, at 122-23.
29Because so much of our behavior developed in the situations facing our evolutionary
ancestors, this focus on the present was likely adaptive for survival. See STEVEN PINKER, How
THEMIND WORS 42 (1997) (explaining that natural selection operates over thousands of years
as people adapt to their environments).
3oSee, e.g., Sunstein, Behavioral Law and Economics, supra note 26, at 131.31See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 21, at 1107-13; Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis, supra
13432001]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
another bias, people dislike extremes in their decision-making and thus tend to
select the middle ground over those extremes.32 Another bias that affects decision-
making is the well-known over-optimism, whereby people overestimate the
probability of an outcome favorable to them or exaggerate their own chances or
abilities when making a decision.33 In addition, people over-weigh the probability
of past outcomes. This is the classic "hindsight bias" where, in retrospect, people
feel that decision-makers in the past should have predicted the outcome that was
in fact not predictable given information actually available at the time.
34
Accordingly, in decision-making of all kinds individuals do not always calculate
in a dispassionate way, weighing the value of each choice as it is established on
an impersonal market, but will likely favor particular choices or outcomes or
simply assign them more weight. Again, in behavioral parlance, people act quasi-
rationally, not rationally nor irrationally.
While biases represent limitations on rationality, there are related ways of
thinking that people have adopted to deal with and to simplify decision-making.
They may not always produce the best outcomes in individual cases although they
may work generally well.35 These are known as "heuristics. 36 For example, a
person may focus on something that is noticeable to him or her as the issue
deserving attention or the problem needing a solution, even if, according to the
probabilistic order of importance, it should not receive this focus (the
"availability" heuristic).3 7 The heuristic can have significant consequences,
particularly regarding attention to harms or risks, when people become overly
focused on a problem that is present in their consciousness, such as an airplane
crash, and ignore others, such as an automobile accident, that are statistically
more likely to occur. Related to this way of thinking is the heuristic of
"anchoring," whereby people make judgments on the basis of a value or-
impression that is initially given or accepted, even if the value is arbitrary and not
appropriate for the issue to be decided. In a similar vein, people often reason or
engage in decision-making based on present cases, examples, or values from
note 26, at 1179-81.
32See Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis, supra note 26, at 1181-82; Sunstein, Behavioral Law
and Economics, supra note 26, at 135-36.33 See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 21, at 1091-95; Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis, supra
note 26, at 1182-84.
34See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 21, at 1095-1100; Sunstein, Behavioral Law and
Economics, supra note 26, at 138-39.35People often need to simplify decision-making because it is too complex or presents
problems of ambiguity. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 21, at 1077-84.
36See, e.g., Sunstein, Behavioral Law and Economics, supra note 26, at 139-42.
37See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 21, at 1087-88 (observing that, under the
availability heuristic, people focus on salient events in their decision-making and ignore their
probability, which can lead to error if the events are not truly representative).38See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 21, at 1100-02; Sunstein, Behavioral Law and
Economics, supra note 26, at 141.
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which they then move away only incrementally. 3
9
These are characteristics of individual human cognition, as is befitting a
behavioral or psychological focus. It would be a mistake, however, to understand
the new behavioral research as limited to this individual focus, for the social focus
is also important in this research. First, the research indicates that presentation or
"framing" devices may trigger the biases and emotional effects. A choice
outcome can be helped along, for example, by framing the desired choice as the
middle one between extremes.4° This finding implies that behavioral modification
can affect large groups of people.
Second, social pressures have been shown to magnify the individual
cognitive biases. For example, there exists the cascade phenomenon whereby the
exercise of the availability heuristic in a few individuals spreads to others, either
because others believe that the first individuals are privy to special information or
because they desire to be recognized as part of a group that advocates a particular
perspective.41 Indeed, the power of a group to reinforce individual cognitive
limitations and even to create its own limitations is particularly relevant for
decision-making in small groups, like boards of directors, which are cohesive and
face difficult, stressful decisions, such as mega-mergers.42
Third, much research in social cognition is aimed at understanding "group-
level knowledge structures," including those that might be shared by all those in
an industry, that both orient and distort the thinking and behavior of decision-
39See Sunstein, BehavioralAnalysis, supra note 26, at 1189-90.
4°See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 21, at 1104-05; Sunstein, Behavioral Law and
Economics, supra note 26, at 139.41 This "herd" movement need not depend upon a quasi-rational mental factor but could
also be based on a rational choice of an individual. See SUSHIL BiKHCHANDANI & SUNIL
SHARMA, HERD BEHAVIOR IN FINANCIAL MARKERS: A REVIEW 5-12 (Int'l Monetary Fund,
Working Paper No. WP/00/48, 2000), at http:/lwww.imf.org/extemal/pubs/cat (last visited
Aug. 29, 200 1) (explaining how "cascades" of behavior can arise from individuals' basing their
decisions on others' actions either because the former interpret the actions as revealing
something about the information that others possess or because they have a rational interest in
hiding their own incompetence by following others).
42The socially motivated distortions of rationality are properly understood as different
from, yet often supporting, individual cognitive limitations. A classic form is the "groupthink"
syndrome, which is the tendency of individuals to arrive at distorted judgments because of
attachment to group norms. See IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF
POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 174-77 (2d ed. 1982). On the issue of conditions, such as
group cohesiveness, giving rise to "groupthink," and symptoms of the group cognitive
problems, see id. at 242-59. Of course, just as individuals can act rationally, groups can
enhance rationality and optimal decision-making. See, e.g., James D. Westphal, Collaboration
in the Boardroom: Behavioral and Performance Consequences of CEO-Board Social Ties, 42
ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 7, 20 (1999) (presenting "study [that] suggests that in fact board
effectiveness and ultimately firm performance may be enhanced by close, trusting CEO-board
relationships combined with moderate to high levels of CEO incentive alignment"). It is simply
important to realize that groups, like individuals, do not always act rationally.
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making groups.43 It is thus important to recognize that the psychological and
behavioral approach includes the social approach because the individual and
social paradigms often interact with, and reinforce, each other.44
One must be cautious, however, about applying these psychological and
behavioral insights. The appearance and strength of biases may well depend upon
the context of their exercise.45 A corporate agent, for instance, might not exhibit
the same "endowment effect" towards a corporate good, and, in working for his
or her principal, may be less susceptible to certain biases. As a general matter,
moreover, the psychological and behavioral approach may not yet be able to offer
a full, theoretical explanation for complex decision-making, such as that exhibited
by a board in a mega-merger.
46
Yet the power of the psychological, behavioral, and social psychological
research to explain human behavior should not be underestimated, even if it
should be applied with caution and care, just because the application of the
43See James P. Walsh, Managerial and Organizational Cognition: Notes from a Trip
Down Memory Lane, 6 ORG. SCIENCE 280, 280-321 (1995) (reviewing and summarizing
literature in the managerial and organizational cognition literature); James D. Westphal &
Edward J. Zajac, Defections from the Inner Circle: Social Exchange, Reciprocity, and the
Diffusion of Board Independence in U.S. Corporations, 162 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 161, 178 (1997)
(explaining growth of board independence in social exchange terms; board members who are
also CEOs at other firms and who have experienced activism become activists themselves and
"diminish their resistance [to] or even actively support such change... so as to restore balance
to their social exchange relationships").
"See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REV. 683, 711 (1999). According to the authors:
The frames through which individuals interpret a situation are generally formed socially.
Their reference points for assessing gains and losses are generally given by popular
conventions and communicated through conversation, not chosen by individuals
autonomously. Anchors, which in principle can vary enormously across individuals, are in
practice the product of social interactions and widely shared information flows.
Id. The focus on the social from the L&E perspective also comes from current work on shared
view or "norms." See generally Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 21, at 1127-34; ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL NORMS: A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE LEGAL ACADEMY
(Yale Law Sch. Program for Studies in L., Econ., and Pub. Policy, Working Paper No. 230,
1999), at http'//papers.ssm.com/so3/papers.cfn (Nov. 28, 1999).
4"For example, Professor Arlen has observed that the "endowment effect" might be
reduced or "matted" when it concerns an easily available consumer good or one held for a short
time. See Arlen et al., supra note 9, at 14-16.
46See Kelman, supra note 21, at 1590-91; Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral
Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1646-47 (2000) (criticizing
simplistic legal application of behavioral theories to law). But see Korobkin & Ulen, supra note
21, at 1073 ("There is no doubt that a single, universally applicable theory of behavior is
convenient and highly desirable. But if universality is inconsistent with sophistication and
realism, legal policymakers are better off foregoing universality and, instead, creating a
collection of situation-specific mini-theories useful in the analysis of discrete legal problems.").
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research to law is a developing field. Indeed, its application to specific decision-
making situations is likely to be highly fruitful because, by identifying the various
psychological factors at work, it underscores and tries to understand and explain
the richness and complexity of any decision, rather than to reduce a decision to a
simple, but unconvincing, rational process.4 7 Mega-mergers are a particularly
appropriate field for this application because decision-making in these large
transactions is complex. Because, moreover, this kind of decision-making has
resulted in so many poor outcomes, it is critical to identify further the mental
characteristics that may have led to these results.48
IV. METHOD AND DATA
The goal of the empirical study is to identify the psychological factors (of the
kind outlined above) that contribute to the momentum of mega-merger decision-
making.49 This should be an important finding, for decision-making in a merger,
particularly a mega-merger, is the archetypal example of a heightened, calculative
rationality that the rational choice model would appear to explain well.50 Because
47Social scientists are also trying to improve rational decision-making. See, e.g., Jerayr
Haleblian & Sydney Finkelstein, The Influence of Organizational Acquisition Experience on
Acquisition Performance:A Behavioral Learning Perspective, 44 ADMIN. SCi. Q. 29, 34-36, 51
(1999) (finding that firms may learn from acquisitions experience, but in a complex way, for
they must learn to generate from past acquisitions information that is relevant to a new, but
similar, acquisition and to disregard their past experience when facing a completely unique,
new acquisition).
48That is, if one looks at the evidence on mergers, one is hard-pressed to say that decision-
makers have rationally learned to avoid problems in these transactions. See Korobkin & Ulen,
supra note 21, at 1071-72.49The study thus follows legal scholars' call for more empirical work on law and
behavioral studies. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 21, at 1058 ('To progress beyond the
current initial stage of scholarship, legal scholars will have to conduct more empirical and
experimental work of their own to test whether these hypotheses [of behavioral studies] are in
fact true in the particularized settings they study.").
5°Indeed, because of this rationality, some feel that organizations and groups in business
are not prone to quasi-rationality. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 21, at 1515 ("Because
corporations and other business associations are so subject to market constraints, there have
been long-standing doubts as to whether psychological biases, even if robust at the individual
level, are likely to have much impact on organized economic behavior."). Cf DONALD C.
LANGEVOORT, THE HUMAN NATURE OF CORPORATE BOARDS: LAW, NORMS AND THE
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILrY 8 (Geo. L. Ctr.,
Working Paper No. 241402, 2000), at http.//papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers (Sep. 18, 2000)
[hereinafter LANGEVOORT, HUMAN NATURE] ("Perhaps even in the world of investing-and
maybe even with respect to things like board independence-symbols matter more than we
think."). But see Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 21, at 1071. The authors state:
Certainly, firms that make clearly suboptimal decisions routinely or in extremely important
circumstances may be driven out of business, but competition in product or capital markets
is rarely so perfect that a firm that occasionally makes decisions that fail to maximize
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a mega-merger is such an important event for a firm, it receives a tremendous
amount of attention from the staffs of firms, CEOs, and board members, as well
as from investment bankers, lawyers, and other investment professionals.51 The
attention is magnified when the merger involves two large firms with widely held
shares that are closely followed by investment professionals, as in a mega-merger.
Given these circumstances, which would appear to eliminate all but rational
reasons for the decision, it would be important to show empirically that
psychological factors are also present in the decision-making. 2
The method of the empirical study, however, poses difficulties. A typical
psychological or social psychological experiment would involve a researcher's
interaction with CEOs, board members, and shareholders in an attempt to identify
and isolate the influence of psychological factors on their merger decision-
making. However, it is difficult to obtain access to these individuals, particularly
when they supervise some of the largest firms in the world and have business and
legal reasons to maintain the confidentiality of their discussions,53 or when, in the
case of shareholders, they are so geographically dispersed. In any event, even if a
researcher could question CEOs and board members about their decision-making,
he or she would be evaluating participants' views of past decisions, which would
not involve a controlled experiment and which might well be influenced by
hindsight bias with the participants justifying their past actions in light of the later
success or failure of a merger.-4 It is also difficult to separate the influence of a
profits will face bankruptcy or be taken over by firms that do maximize.
Id.
51 See Dennis Carey (moderator), Lessons from Master Acquirers: A CEO Roundtable on
Making Mergers Succeed, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 2000, at 147-48 (CEOs and former
CEOs speaking about mergers and acquisitions; while some of them deny the reality of the
negative results of mergers, others highlight many ways in which mergers fail and admit that
the transactions are risky).
52 Others have suggested that behavioral biases are present in this kind of decision-making.
See Ghemawat & Ghadar, supra note 13, at 69-70 (discussing various management biases that
predispose executives and boards to engage in mega-transactions: e.g., CEOs focusing only on
increasing revenues, using inflated stock prices, being stuck in an industry mind-set, following
the "herd behavior" of an industry, being personally committed to a deal, and trusting self-
interested advisors).
n Management scholars do conduct field research involving directors. See, e.g., Mason A.
Carpenter & James D. Westphal, The Strategic Context of External Network Ties: Examining
the Impact of Director Appointments on Board Involvement in Strategic Decision Making, 44
ACAD. OF MGMT. J. (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 13-16) (describing a process of
studying board strategic behavior by sending written questionnaires to board members, but
noting that "requests for participation linked the current study with an ongoing series of surveys
on top management issues conducted by a major business school to which hundreds of their
peers had responded").
mAnother approach is shown in JANIS, supra note 42. He studies decision-making by
members of the executive branch based on extensive analysis of reports or autobiographies of
participants in the decisions and of interviews with them (e.g., decision-makers in the Cuban
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rational from a quasi-rational factor in a merger without a relatively long time
period to judge the success or failure of a transaction and without controlling for
all possible factors influencing a decision.
An alternative is to design an experiment that replicates in a controlled
environment merger decision-making by having available people (such as law
students) simulate board decisions. Aside from posing ethical problems when
conducted by someone other than a trained psychologist,55 this classic
psychological experiment also may not capture the richness and complexity of a
real-life merger decision. 6 While psychologists should continue to conduct these
kinds of experiments, other approaches are available to legal scholars if the point
is to establish that psychological factors play a role in mega-mergers decision-
making.
One readily available data source for an empirical study of mega-mergers is
the group of documents reflecting what CEOs and board members of each
merging firm publicly say about their decision-maling at or near the time of the
process.57 Under federal securities laws, they are required to give their reasons for
the transaction, from the announcement of the deal until its consummation, and
particularly when seeking shareholder approval of the transaction.58 Indeed, this
missile crisis). Social psychologists have made efforts to systematize his approach by, for
example, evaluating and comparing the views of numerous participants in and reviewers of a
particular decision. See, e.g., Philip E. Tetlock et al., Assessing Political Group Dynamics: A
Test of the Groupthink Model, 63 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 403 (1992). The problem is that
similar research materials are not generally available on decisions by boards because their
decisions are not of historical importance and thus do not generate much available archival
materials (other than board minutes) or scholarly attention in the absence of substantial
litigation. Occasionally, the decisions receive journalistic attention. See generally BILL VLASIc
& BRADLEY A. STERTz, TAKEN FOR A RIDE: How DAMLER-BENZ DROVE OFF WrrH
CHRYSLER (2000) (discussing management deliberations leading up to this notorious, value
destroyng mega-merger).
One of the most disturbing aspects of the current interest in behavioral studies by law
professors is that it may spawn inappropriate experiments on law students by people who have
no real competence to conduct them.
m Even Mason Carpenter and James Westphal admit in their study of board participation in
strategic decision-making that their "empirical approach does not permit a direct examination of
the cognitions that mediate these relationships." Carpenter & Westphal, supra note 53, at 29.
See also Arlen, supra note 25, at 1769 ("[T]he environment in which people actually operate
and make choices is far more complex than the environment of most behavioral experiments.");
id. at 1777 ("In addition, individuals making risky choices in the real world often are subject to
more than one bias and employ multiple heuristics, with sometimes conflicting effects.").
sThis empirical study is thus related to the social psychological approach where
psychologists study decision-making from reports of participants in the process. See supra note
42 and accompanying text.
"'See U.S. SECU~imEs AND EXCH. COMM'N, FORM S-4 (REGISTRATION STATEMENT
UNDER SECURrEs Acr OF 1933), Item 4(a)(2) (2000), at
http'//www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/formss-4.htm (last modified Nov. 28, 2000) (stipulating
inclusion of the "reasons of the registrant and of the company being acquired for engaging in
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federal disclosure is grounded upon a state corporate law statutory requirement
that board members of a firm first approve a merger and recommend it to their
shareholders.59 As a federal, if not state, legal matter, these reasons include the
"beliefs" and "opinions" of the CEOs and board membersi 0
There are several reasons why these documents are reliable sources of data
for the presence and the exercise of psychological factors in merger decision-
making by boards of directors. First, under both federal securities law and state
corporate law, board members have legal liability for the statements, including for
their expression of beliefs and opinions.6t Second, because the official SEC filings
for a merger are reviewed and screened by so many people (particularly by
lawyers concerned about litigation if the transaction is unsuccessful and
executives worried about disclosing too much information to competitors),
psychological factors must have played a role in the decision-making if evidence
of their presence manages to survive the screening and appears in the SEC
statements.62 Third, the psychological factors detected are not only indicative of
board decision-making, but also are intended to persuade shareholders to vote for
the merger in question. That is, because the SEC documents show both what
influenced the CEOs and board members and what they believe should affect the
shareholders, any psychological factors appearing in the documents are over-
determined and thus likely to have played a role in the decision-making. Indeed,
the hypothesis here is that CEOs and board members are not cynical or
manipulative. Rather, they generally believe in a merger and try to persuade
others of the reasons that they themselves found persuasive. 63
The empirical study is as follows: The data are the ten largest announced U.S.
the transaction"). Form S-4 is used to register the securities of an acquirer in a stock-for-stock
merger and may also be used as a proxy statement to explain the transaction to target and
acquirer shareholders and to seek their vote to approve it. Id. at General Instruction E.
59See RODMAN WARD, JR. Er AL., FOLK'S ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION
LAW § 251(b) (4th ed. 2000). The focus in this article, as in the ongoing study, is on Delaware
corporate law, the applicable law for corporate governance of most U.S. publicly owned firms.
60See Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1091-96 (1991) (explaining
that opinions and beliefs are statements of "material fact); see also infra Part VI.A.
, See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1994); supra note 60.
62 Cf Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L.
REV. 763, 846-74 (1995) (discussing a company's reasons for secrecy when undertaking SEC
mandated disclosure).
63See, e.g., JANIS, supra note 42, at 247; see also Langevoort, supra note 21, at 1506
("Indeed, some biases create self-fulfilling prophecies by prompting others to behave in a more
favorable fashion. In this sense, using the term irrationality may convey an unnecessarily
pejorative connotation."). Again, the psychological focus is not meant to deny, but only to
supplement, the rational deliberative activity of board members and management, which the
management literature highlights. See, e.g., Carpenter & Westphal, supra note 53, at 26-29
(discussing findings showing that the extent of board participation in strategic decision-making
depends upon board background and upon whether the state of the industry of the firm is stable
or rapidly changing).
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stock-for-stock (or primarily stock) mega-mergers for each of the last three years,
as identified in terms of the market value of acquirer shares offered for the target
firm by appropriate market data sources.64 These are the most significant
transactions in terms of dollar value, the most likely either to create or lose value
because of their size, and, as noted above, the typical transaction of the late 1990s
and early 2000s. The data include cross-border deals because so many
contemporary transactions are cross-border.65 However, because the kind of
disclosure available for non-U.S. companies is not uniform, the data set includes
only cross-border stock-for-stock transactions where the acquirer is a foreign
party and the target is a U.S. corporation.66
The study gathers information about the reasons for these transactions from
two SEC sources. The first is the press release at the time of announcement of the
merger, which is generally filed with the SEC in a Form 8-K.67 The second source
is the Form S-4, which is used to register the acquirer shares offered in the
merger. The Form S-4 is usually combined in mega-mergers with proxy
statements seeking the approval of shareholders of both firms in the 'Joint
6To identify the top 1998 transactions, I used The Top Ten Deals of 1998, FORTUNE, Jan.
11, 1999, at 72; for 1999, Top 50 US M&A Transactions of 1999, at
http://www.thedailydeal.com (last modified Oct. 25, 2000); for 2000, 25 Largest Deals-Year
to Date, at http://www.cnnfin.cnn.com/news/deals/mergers/biggest.html (Oct. 30, 2000). I
cross-checked these statistics with information about the top transactions in 1998-2000 with
reports available to non-subscribers from Thomson Financial Securities Data (formerly the
Securities Data Company). See, e.g., Richard Peterson, The World Is Not Enough ,.. To Merge,
at http://www.tfsd.com (Mar. 15, 2000). I use announced, rather than completed transactions
because the study primarily concerns the influence of the psychological factors on board
decisions. It is thus irrelevant whether, in fact, the merger was consummated. Several mergers
in the database (e.g., MCI/Sprint, GE/Honeywell) were terminated before completion.
65 See Bernard S. Black, The First International Merger Wave (and the Fifth and Last U.S.
Wave), 54 U. MLAMI L. REv. 799, 800 (2000) (discussing how the current merger wave-
which he identifies as running from 1993 to the present-is increasingly an international, rather
than U.S., merger wave); Kang & Johansson, supra note 13, at 7-13 (presenting statistics on
cross-border mergers & acquisitions).
6That is, if non-U.S. targets were used, there would be problems with different disclosure
frameworks governing these targets, to say nothing about translation difficulties. If the target is
a U.S. company, the mandated disclosure on its board's reasons for the transaction is
comparable to that required for any U.S. target, and, if the acquirer is non-U.S. and is offering
its stock in the transaction to this U.S. target, federal securities laws require disclosure about the
acquirer's reasons for the transaction that is comparable to disclosure demanded for a U.S.
acquirer. See U.S. SEcuRrrmEs AND EXCH. COMM'N, FORM F-4 (REGISTRATION STATEMENT
UNDER THE SECURMES Act OF 1933), Item 4(a)(2) (2000), available at
http'//www.sec.gov/divisionscorpfin/forms/f-4.htm (last modified Jun. 27, 2001).
67See U.S. SECuRIrEs AND EXCH. COMM'N, FORM 8-K, General Instruction F, Items 1-2
(2000), at http'/www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/ forms/8-k.htm (last modified Jun. 27,2001). A*
non-U.S. issuer can use Form 6-K for the same disclosure, pursuant to 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15d-
16 (2001), although no securities law liability attaches to such report.
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proxy/prospectus. 68 This source includes summaries of and actual reports from
third parties, such as investment bankers, who are asked to give "fairness
opinions" on the transaction.6
The study then reviews this data for evidence of psychological factors in
mega-merger decision-making. For the study, a grid of psychological factors
based on the psychological literature summarized earlier was prepared (see
Appendix A for an explanation of the factors used in the study). The documents
for each merger were then examined in relation to the grid to detect the presence
(or absence) and strength of the psychological factors at work in the reported
decision-making in each merger. This examination resulted in a table of the
psychological factors, with supporting evidence for their presence and strength,
for each merger.70 From these thirty individual tables, tables on the psychological
factors for mega-mergers in each year and for all three-years were generated.7'
The application of the merger grid and preparation of the tables has an
undeniable interpretive, textual aspect to it. Finding the presence of a particular
psychological factor in the written data on merger decision-making and assessing
its strength involves an interpretation of the justifications given by the firms
within the framework of the merger grid, as the narrative discussion of results
below will show.
Questions about the scientific or objective character of this kind of analysis
can certainly be raised. With a pre-established merger grid, an analyst might be
oriented towards finding examples of the factors, especially since the study
involves a textual interpretation. This is an issue that affects all objective studies
in psychology and social psychology. 72 Admittedly, though, the factor may be
more serious with this study because it lacks those disciplines' efforts to ensure
objectivity. The simple response to this concern is that the data used in this study
6See FORM S-4, supra note 58, at General Instruction E.1. Whether an acquirer's
shareholders must vote generally turns on the number of acquirer shares to be issued in the
transaction. In sum, if an acquirer does not have enough authorized shares for issuance (often
the case in a mega-merger), it must amend its certificate of incorporation to increase them,
which requires a shareholder vote. Listing rules of the New York Stock Exchange and the
NASDAQ require shareholder approval if a listed company issues common stock whereby
either its outstanding shares or voting power will be increased by 20%, other than during a
public offering. N. Y. STOCK EXCH., N. Y. STOCK ExCH. LISTED CO. MANUAL § 312.03(c)
(1999); NATL. Assoc. OF SECuRmEs DEALERS, INC. (NASD), THE NASD MANUAL
§ 4350(i)(D)(i) (2000). For non-U.S. companies, the applicable document is the combined F-
4/proxy statement. See FORM S-4, supra note 58, at General Instruction F.
6See FORM S-4, supra note 58, at Item 4(b).
7°For one example of these tables, see Appendix B. My research assistant, Philip
Lindenbaum, diligently helped me prepare the tables.71 See inlfra Part V.A.
72See JANIS, supra note 42, at 193-94; Tetlock, supra note 54, at 417-18; Walsh, supra
note 43, at 308 ("The most fundamental challenge to researchers assessing a knowledge
structure is to be certain they are measuring the subject's knowledge structure and not their
own:").
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is public and thus available for all to review, evaluate, and reinterpret. The study
is, moreover, intended as only a first step to identify and examine psychological
factors in merger decision-making. Further studies would ideally use other data
sources, if such ever became available, and would involve other analysts.
Another question is whether the data actually reflect the presence of
psychological factors or are simply "boilerplate" used by drafters of the
registration statements, particularly the lawyers who are inclined to repeat
themselves in transactional documents. There is a risk of this phenomenon
affecting the data because investment bankers and lawyers, like all human beings,
follow set strategies in dealing with repeated situations and they are clearly repeat
players in mergers. 73 Indeed, the review of the data reveals some hilarious and
potentially embarrassing examples of mindless use of boilerplate in
proxy/registration statements.74 Yet set statements do not necessarily suggest that
the psychological factors are not present in the decision-making of a particular
merger. Rather, because exercise of the psychological factors is to a great extent
programmed in human beings, it would be a surprise if they were not shared by
CEOs, board members, and their agents or consultants and even became
standardized in the documents.75 In any event, the data shows enough differences
in the registration statements to ensure that they are not all copies of a few
models.
Finally, the study includes empirical data about the success or failure of each
merger in terms of the merger's effect on the acquirer's market value. It also
reviews the relationship between the data on the psychological factors and the
share price data.
73See generally Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate
Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 347,
359-65 (1996) (discussing psychological factors that may lead lawyers to use standardized
contracts and documents, even when the documents might be less beneficial for particular
clients than those that the lawyers could draft anew).
74 To take only one example, the description of the reasons for the merger in the
proxy/registration statement for the Norwest/ells Fargo merger at times uses identical
language to that in the Bane One/First Chicago merger. To be charitable to the drafters, one
could say that these documents were filed close in time (September and July 1998) and that the
firms, which were all banks, may well have had the same reasons for the transactions.
75From the rational choice perspective, although lawyers and investment bankers may be
seen as individuals who counter the exercise of psychological factors, such as excessive
optimism, by CEOs, they also have a significant financial incentive (and thus rationally self-
interested motive) to argue strongly in favor of, and not against, the mega-mergers. See Arlen,
supra note 25, at 1784. 1 suggest, moreover, that they are often swept up in the momentum of a
transaction, despite (as in the case of lawyers) their legal role of warning CEOs about its risks.
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V. TABULAR RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. Tabular Results
Table 1 presents the overall results of the presence and strength of the
indicated psychological factors for the thirty mergers over the three-year period.
To provide more detailed information about the psychological factors specific
mergers exhibited, Tables 2-4 break down the results of Table 1 for each of the
three years studied.
TABLE 1
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN MEGA-MERGERS
1998 Mergers 1999 Mergers 2000 Mergers
S Strong Middle Weak Strong Middle Weak Strong Middle Weak
Myopia (Impulses) 6 4 6 4 3 5 2
Bounded Rationality
Loss Aversion 10 7 3 8 2
Extremeness Aversion 3 5 2 5 3 2 3 6 1
Oyer-optimism 5 5 2 7 1 4 1 5




PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS FOR 1998 MEGA-MERGERS
STRENGTH Strong Middle Weak
FACTOR
Myopia (Impulses) x Banc One/FC a AT&T/TCl
" Bell Atlantic/GTE a BP/Amoco
" Daimler/Chrysler z NationsBankBA




RaUonalify = Banc One/FC








Extremeness * Bell Atlantic(GTE * Banc One/FC a AT&T/TCl
Aversion * Daimler(Chrysler * BP/Amoco a Travelers/
(italics indicate 0 NorwestlWells Fargo - Exxon/Mobil Citicorp
firms for which the
aversion is * NatonsBank/BA
particularly strong) X SBC/Ameitech
Over-optimism a Banc One/FC 2 AT&TITC
a Daimler/Chrysler * Bell AtlanUc/GTE
X NationsBank/BA a BP/Amoco
Nonwest/Vells Fargo a Exxon/Mobil
a Travelers/Citicorp a SBC/Ameritech
M Banc One/FC W AT&T/TCl Travelers/
Anchoring a Bell Atlantic/GTE a Daimler/Chrysler Citicorp
X BP/Amoco 5 Exxon/Mobil
a NationsBank/BA 0 Norwest/Wells-
a SBC/Amedtech Fargo
NOTE: BA = Bank of America; FC = First Chicago.
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TABLE 3
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS FOR 1999 MEGA-MERGERS
STRENGTH
ACTOR Strong Middle Weak
* Aegonfrransamerica • Clear ChanneVAMFM
Myopia (Impulses) s AT&T/MediaOne B Dow/Union Carbide
* BP Amoco/ARCO a Lucent/Ascend
= PfizerW-L 0 ViacomICBS
B Qwest/US West
* MCI/Sprint
B Aegon/Transamerica N AT&T/MediaOne
Bounded Rationalrdy BP Amoco/ARCO X Dow/Union Carbide
* Clear ChanneVAMFM * LucentAscend




* BP Amoco/ARCO . Aegon[Transamedca m Dow/
Extremeness B Clear ChannelIAMFM B AT&TIMediaOne UnionAversionCrid A PfizerW-L B LucentlAscend Carbide
(italics indicate firms . Viacom/
for which the aversion B Qwesf/US West CBS
is particularly strong) B MCIISpnint
Over-optimism * Qwest/US West X AegonfTransamerica Clear -
B MCI/Sprint 0 AT&T/MediaOne Channell





Anchoring B Clear ChanneVAMFM N Aegon/Transamerica
B PlizerW-L B AT&T/MediaOne









PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS FOR 2000 MEGA-MERGERS
STRENGTH
FACTOR Strong Middle Weak
0 Chase/J.P. Morgan • AOLTirme Warner * El Paso/
Myopia (Impulses) 0 JDS/SDL a Citigroup/ Coastal
M Chevron/Texaco Assocates • GE/





Bounded Ratonarty AOLfrime Warner a Citigroup/
a Chase/J.P. Morgan Associates






* D TelJVoiceSrm . AOUf7me Warner Firstar/
Extremeness * JDSlSDL a Chase/J.P. Morgan U.S.
Aversion • Citigroup/ Bancorp
* Chevron/Texaco Associates(italics indicate firms Ascae
for which the aversion * El Paso/Coastal
is particularly strong) a VeriSignfNetwork
* GE/Honeywell
* AOL/TW 8 Citigroup/ * D TelJ
Over-optimism * Chase/J.P. Morgan Associates VoiceStlm
* Chevron/Texaco d El Paso/






* AOL/Time Warner a Chase/J.P. Morgan
Anchoring * Citigroup/Associates 8 D TelJVoiceStrrn
* Chevron/Texaco N JDS/SDL
* El Paso/Coastal • VeriSign/Network
* Firstar/U.S. Bancorp a GE/Honeywell
NOTE: D TelJVoiceStrm = Deutsche Telekom. VoiceStream
13572001]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
B. Analysis oflndividual Responses
The following discussion describes the kind of textual evidence that the study
found indicative of the presence and strength of the psychological factors in the
data set.
1. Myopia
This factor is difficult to extract from a documentary record of decision-
making because, as noted earlier, .it suggests that for impulsive, emotional
reasons, a present event or circumstance inordinately influences decision-making.
In mega-merger decision-making, this factor could be indicated by the essentially
reactive nature of the transaction as a response to an industry shock or a trend that
is viewed as path-breaking, that shakes up an industry, and that spurs further
industry consolidation. 76 The breakdown in Tables 1-4 demonstrates that if a
recent shock cause of a mega-merger is repeatedly mentioned, the merger
receives a "strong" characterization on myopia; if the cause is mentioned only in
passing and other non-shock causes, such as firm strategies, receive more
attention, the transaction has a "middle" label; and if no external event is
described as having led to the transaction or if such an event is mentioned only in
passing, the deal receives a "weak" designation (suggesting that, in some cases,
the factor is absent).
"Strong" is the most common characterization, which is not surprising in
light of the common understanding in business studies that mergers generally are
due to industry shocks." The myopia of the strong characterization is
demonstrated by repeated references in the SEC documents on a given mega-
merger to recent industry consolidation and competitor mega-mergers, with less
emphasi.s given to the underlying causes of the consolidation, such as a regulatory
or technological change or some other shock.78 This presentation characterizes
76A firm's "myopic" focus on competitors' mergers is often cited anecdotally as a reason
for the value destruction in a given merger. See, e.g., Michael Amdt et al., Let's Talk Turkeys,
Bus. WK., Dec. 11, 2000, at 44, 46 ("Many duds are 'me-too mergers' that cost way too
much.").
77See supra note 13.
78But see JDS UNIPHASE CORP., REGISTRATION STATEMENT ON FORM S-4 5 (2000)
[hereinafter JDS/SDL FORM S-4] (with respect to the SDL merger, "JDS Uniphase and SDL
are proposing the merger in response to unprecedented growth in the teleconmunications
industry and demand for the fiber optic networks that are enabling such growth."). This focus
on competitor action echoes a finding in the social cognition literature that many CEO decision
errors are due to the excessive attention paid to the actions of a few firms that the CEO
considers to be similar to his or her firm. See Zahra & Chaples, supra note 14, at 13-14; see
also Joseph F. Porac & Howard Thomas, Taxonomic Mental Models in Competitor Definition,
15 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 224,233 (1990).
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many banking and telecommunications mega-mergers in the data set,79 as well as
oil industry mergers, which have as one cause the industry shock of low prices. °O
Indeed, the myopic attention to a firm's competitors becomes even more
pronounced when a firm secures a merger partner over competition with a rival
industry bidder."
A "middle" myopic characterization is given when the applicable SEC
documents mention industry consolidation in passing and present the merger as
driven by other purposes, such as the development or advancement of new
technology, a new technological gamble, or an innovative cross-industry
combination. 2 In other cases, a first merger will have this characterization, but
later mergers in the industry, stressing an industry consolidation that has been
triggered or pushed along by the first merger, have a strong myopia rating.83 A
79 See, e.g., CHASE MANHATTAN CO., REGISTRATION STATEMENT ON FORM S-4 28 (2000)
[hereinafter CHAsE/J.P. MORGAN FORM S-4] (discussing the J.P. Morgan merger. "During the
past several years the financial services industry has undergone a significant consolidation. As a
result, our principal competitors in many of our most important business lines have become
global in size and in range of product offerings."); SBC COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
REGSTRATION STATEMENT ON FORM S-4 21-22 (1998) [hereinafter SBC/AMErrEcH FORM S-
4] (mentioning how the Telecommunications Act of 1996 "helped lead to rapid change in the
telecommunications industry').
wThis factor was especially noticeable in 1998. For example, Arco characterized its
merger with BP Amoco as follows: "ARCO's management believes that the largest worldwide
oil and gas companies, such as Royal Dutch/Shell, BP Amoco, and the proposed combined
Exxon/Mobil, have the scale and diversity of operations, financial strength and international
presence that allow them to pursue the most profitable projects and to achieve superior financial
results." ATLANTIC RICHFIELD, SCHEDULE 14A 23 (1999) [hereinafter ARCO/BP AMOCO
SCHEDULE 14A] (for BP Amoco merger).
"
1See, e.g., QWF.ST COMMUNICATIONS INT'L, INC., AMEND. No. 2 TO REGISTRATION
STATEMENT ON FORM S-4 1-11 (1999) [hereinafter QWEST/LJS WEST FORM S-4] (discussing
competition from Global Crossing for U.S. West merger); PFIZER, INC., AMEND. No. 2 TO
REGISTRATION STATEMENT ON FORM S-4 1-45-46 (2000) [hereinafter PFIZER/WARNER-
LAMBERT FORM S-4] (discussing competing transaction proposed between Warner-Lambert
and American Home Products for Warner-Lambert merger).
'2See, e.g., AT&T CORP., REGISTRATION STATEMENT ON FORM S-4 31 (1999) [hereinafter
AT&T/TCI FORM S-4] (explaining, for TCI merger, benefits of the combination of long
distance and cable, which also responded to industry consolidation); DEUTSCHE TELEKOM AG,
REGISTRATION STATEMENT ON FORM F-4 1 (2000) [hereinafter DEUTSCHE
TELEKOM/VOICESTREAM FORM F-4] (establishing worldwide platform for GSM services
through the VoiceStream merger); TRAVELERS GROUP, INC., REGISTRATION STATEMENT ON
FORM S-4 19 (1998) [hereinafter TRAVELERSCITICORP FORM S-4] (discussing linkage of
insurance and banking products in Citicorp merger).
Compare AMOCO CORP., SCHEDULE 14A 31 (1998) [hereinafter BP/AMOCO SCHEDULE
14A] (middle myopia characterization for British Petroleum merger), with EXXON CORP.,
REGISTRATION STATEMENT ON FORM S-4 1-19 (1999) [hereinafter EXXON/MOBIL FORM S-4]
(strong myopia characterization for Mobil merger). This trend is seen in bank mergers, although
they always focus prominently on industry consolidation. Compare NATIONSBANK CORP.,
REGISTRATION STATEMENT ON FORM S-4 37 (1998) [hereinafter
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middle characterization also occurs where there are few mega-mergers in a
particular industry, although there may be smaller transactions. s4 Finally, myopia
is rarely "weak"; in such cases, the transaction appears to be completely
strategic.
2. Loss Aversion, "Status Quo" Bias
Repeated statements that the mega-merger does not change the existing
features of the combining firms, or is a change justified by an effort not to lose
one firn's or both firms' competitive position(s), give a transaction a "strong"
characterization on this psychological factor. Less emphasis in the SEC data
results in a "middle" label, with little or no indication leading to a "weak'
characterization.
It is not surprising that so many mega-mergers in the data set exhibit the
characteristic of loss aversion or status quo bias in the "strong" form (ten in 1998,
seven in 1999, and eight in 2000). Many of them, particularly in banking and
telecommunications, are presented as merger-of-equals transactions, which by
definition maintain the status quo of each firm, albeit in a revised form. The firms
are combined in a pseudo-partnership where much about each fin endures, such
as some management and board members and all shareholders. Indeed, evocation
of the bias makes a mega-merger psychologically compelling in the decision-
NATIONSBANK/BANKAMERICA FORM S-4] (middle myopia characterization for BankAmerica
merger), with NORWvEST CORP., REGISTRATION STATEMENT ON FORM S-4 22 (1998) [hereinafter
NORWEST/WEL.LS FARGO FORM S-4] (strong characterization for Wells Fargo merger,
particularly given the following discussion of the origin of the transaction: "Following the April
1998 announcements of merger agreements between NationsBank Corporation and
BankAmerica Corporation, and between Banc One Corporation and First Chicago NBD
Corporation, such a review [about business combinations] was conducted at the regularly
scheduled meeting of the Wells Fargo Board on April 16, 1998."). But see CrTGROUP, INC.,
REGISTRATION STATEMENT ON FORM S-4 16 (2000) [hereinafter CrrIGROuP/AssOCIATEs FORM
S-4] (middle characterization for Associates First Capital merger); U.S. BANCORP,
REGISTRATION STATEMENT ON FORM S-4 20 (2000) [hereinafter FrRSTAR/U.S. BANCORP FORM
S-4] (middle characterization for Firstar merger, with Firstar being the acquirer). Perhaps, as
time goes on, a consolidation focus will become standard in the industry (and accepted in all
board decision-making) and thus will not receive much attention in a mega-merger's SEC
documents.
8See, e.g., CLEAR CHANNEL COMMUNICATIONS, INC., REGISTRATION STATEMENT ON
FORM S-4 I-1 (2000) [hereinafter CLEAR CHANNEIJAMFM FORM S-4] (broadcasting); DOw
CHEMICAL Co., REGISTRATION STATEMENT ON FORM S-4 20 (1999) [hereinafter DOW/UNION
CARBIDE FORM S-4] (chemicals).
85See, e.g., EL PASO ENERGY CORP., AMEND. No. 1 TO FORM S-4 (2000) [hereinafter EL
PASO/CoASTAL FORM S-4] (weak myopia for Coastal merger); GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.,
REGISTRATION STATEMENT ON FORM 8-4 (2000) [hereinafter G.EJIHONEYwELL FORM S-4]
(weak myopia for Honeywell merger). This weak "myopia" may augur well for the success of
these transactions. See infra Part V.C. & D.
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making of CEOs, board members, and shareholders and even in the perspective
of other parties who have no vote on a transaction, but whose views could affect
its consummation.
One important group is employees of both firms who are being reassured that
they will not immediately lose their positions in the mega-merger. 6 Also,
financial professionals must be convinced that the mega-merger is not
undermining the strengths of the two merging firms. In addition, regulators are
also clearly addressees of this bias. In particular, antitrust regulators must be made
to understand that the merger does not change the existing competitive situation
in a prohibited way.
The indications of the status quo bias range from the general to the specific.
A common sign that has both a rational and quasi-rational side is the frequent
reference to the merging firms' "complementary" businesses, with the suggestion
that the firms will each continue in the new entity.87 Another sign emphasizes the
compatibility of the two firms and their sharing of culture, visions, and/or
strategies.88 The complementary and compatible indications are often joined.89
'6For example, middle management executives have to be assured that they will not lose
their position or at least that they will still be able to compete for the same or higher positions in
the new firm through the "toumament life" that characterizes business. See Langevoort, supra
note 50, at 12 ("I have long suspected that a portion of what is often described as an often
unprofitable 'acquisition bias' among American corporations is in fact driven by senior
managers' desire--conscious or not-to benefit the talented subordinate executives in the
firm?2.
See, e.g., AEGON N.V., REGISTRATION STATEMENT ON FORM F-4 18 (1999) [hereinafter
AEGONIRANSAMERICA FORM F-4] (discussing "complementaries" for Transamerica merger);
MCI WORLDCOM INC., AMEND. NO. 1 TO REGISTRATON STATEMENT ON FORM S-4 44 (1999)
[hereinafter MCI WORLDCOMISPRINT FORM S-4] (for Sprint merger, speaking about the
companies' "complementary" technologies of hard wire and wireless communications). The
emphasis on this word may have an antitrust implication: i.e., if the businesses are
complementary, they will present no anti-competitive threat under antitrust laws. See Matt
Murray, GE's Welch Makes Casefor Acquisition ofHoneywell and Delayed Retirement, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 24, 2000, at A10 (quoting GE's Jack Welch in his justifications for the
GE/Honeywell merger).
8See, e.g., Press Release, Exxon/Mobil, Exxon and Mobil Sign Merger Agreement (Dec.
1, 1998), at http'//wwv.businesswire.com (Dec. 1, 1998) (in joint statement CEOs point out
that the "merger brings together two outstanding organizations that share common values, have
compatible strategies and demonstrated track records of achievement") (emphasis added);
CHEVRON CORP., REGISTRATION STATEMENT ON FORM S-4 20 (2001) [hereinafter
CHEVRON/TEXACO FORM S-4] ("In addition, Chevron and Texaco share common corporate
values. These values include protection of the environment, active support for the communities
where we operate, and promoting diversity and opportunity in our workforce and among our
business partners.").
89See, e.g., FIRsTAR/U.S. BANCORP FORM S-4, supra note 83, at 23 (speaking of the
"complementary nature" of the businesses and the "common vision" of management);
NAIONSBANK/BANKAMERICA FORM S-4, supra note 83, at 42 (giving, as a reason for the
merger, "the belief of BankAmerica's senior management and of the BankAmerica Board that
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The continuation of the status quo is also given tangible proof in the
numerous gestures for which many mega-mergers-of-equals are well known.
Often the continuation of a target's name and its headquarters is promised and
highlighted. 90 These gestures as signs of no change in the status quo are
particularly important in cross-border mergers where, for public relations and
political reasons, the continuing U.S. existence of the target must be emphasized.
The Daimler/Chrysler merger is the best and, in light of its subsequent history,
most notorious example.91 Well-known signs of the status quo, because of the
frequency with which they break down, are the often-detailed arrangements about
the continuation of management and board members of each firm.92
NationsBank and BankAmerica share a compatible culture and that their managements possess
complementary skills and expertise") (emphasis added).
9Exemplary in this regard is the following statement from SBC & Ameritech's press
release:
In fact, SBC made a commitment to Ameritech that employment levels in the five-state
region will not be reduced due to the transaction, as well as to:
maintain Ameritech's headquarters in Chicago and its state headquarters in its
traditional states of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio and Wisconsin;
continue to use the Ameritech name in each of its operating states;
continue to support economic development and education in Ameritech's
region consistent with its well-established commitment; and
continue Ameritech's historic levels of charitable contributions and community
activities.
Press Release, SBC Communications IncJAmeritech, SBC Communications and Ameritech to
Merge (May 11, 1998), at http://www.sbc.com/ NewsCenter (May 11, 1998); see also Press
Release, Chase Manhattan Corp/J.P. Morgan, Chase and Morgan Agree to Merge (Sept. 13,
2000), at http://www.jpmorgan.com/Corplnfo/PressReleases/2000 (Sept. 13, 2000) (observing
that the new firm will be known as J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., despite the fact that J.P. Morgan
was the target); Charles Gasparino & Jathon Sapsford, As Morgan Persisted in Clinging to Its
Past, Time Finally Ran Out, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2000, at Al (emphasizing the importance to
J.P. Morgan executives of retaining the firm's name). There are, of course, strategic marketing
considerations in the choice of a name. See, e.g., NORVEST/WELIS FARGO FORM S-4, supra
note 83, at 24 ("We will take advantage of one of the most venerable names in banking: as part
of the merger, Norwest will be renamed 'Wells Fargo & Company."').
91 See, e.g., DAIMLER/CHRYSLER AG, REGISTRATION STATEMENT ON FORM F-4 16-17
(1998) [hereinafter DAIMLER/CHRYSLER FORM F-4]; AEGONfIRANSAMERICA FORM F-4, supra
note 87, at 17. For more information on the post-merger dispute between Dairler/Chrysler and
Kirk Kerkorian, one of its largest shareholders, see Kerkorian Sues Daimler Chrysler, available
at http://www.cnnfn.cnn.com/2000/l1/27/news/chrysler (Nov. 27, 2000) (describing
Kerkorian's claim that Daimler never intended for the merger to be a "merger-of-equals").
92The examples of the arrangements are numerous. See AOL TIME WARNER INC.,
REGISTRATION STATEmENT ON FORM S-4 37 (2000) [hereinafter AO./TIME WARNER FORM S-
4] (for Time Wamer merger, explaining that the CEO of AOL becomes Chairman of the new
company;, that Time Wamer's CEO becomes CEO of the new company;, that there will be a
sixteen member board with eight members drawn from each company, that this arrangement
must remain for one year after the merger;, and that no change in board size can occur without a
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The data also shows that the use of loss aversion indicates that the status quo
is being preserved in a complex way. Merging firms often suggest both that they
are not really changing themselves and that they have to incur the enormous risks
involved in a mega-merger so as to preserve in the future things as they are
now-the "loss aversion." Indeed, the most psychologically forceful way of
justifying the transaction, which often goes hand in hand with myopia, is to state
that the merger is necessary for each firm to survive in a competitive industry and
that, if the transaction is not undertaken soon, both firms may not be able to
continue as industry leaders.93 A less forceful example of this approach is simply
to describe the transaction as demanded by diversification to address potential
(but not immediate) losses arising from industry cycles.94 Loss aversion and status
75% vote of existing board until the end of 2003); QWEST/US WEST FORM S-4, supra note 81,
at 1-5-6 (describing arrangement with its three CEOs); VIACOM INC., REGISTRATION
STATEMENT ON FORM S-4 8 (1999) (describing elaborate governance arrangements for CBS
merger with a board often members from Viacom and eight from CBS; with the Chairman and
CEO of Viacom remaining and CBS's CEO becoming President and COO; and with the
governance arrangement remaining generally stable for three years). Naturally, this latter
arrangement had a rational explanation-Mr. Redstone of Viacom would dominate the
combined company, and thus CBS needed some assurance of continuation of its own
management post-merger. The "blowups" of these arrangements have become notorious. See
Rick Brooks et al., Ousting of Coulter Isn't the Only Fracture at New Bank mnerica, WALL ST.
J., Oct 23, 1998, at Al (describing ouster of co-CEO of BankAmerica); David Weidner,
Citigroup's John Reed to Step Down, at http://www.thedailydeal.com (last visited Aug. 17,
2001) (describing departure of co-CEO of Citigroup).
93For example, Bell Atlantic and GTE made the following observation (so common in
telecommunications mergers):
The telecommunications industry continues to change dramatically as a result of
developments in technology, regulation, consumer needs and the range of product
offerings made possible by these changes. In this new environment, a select group of
national and international companies that offer a full range of local and long distance,
voice and data services will be the most effective competitors in the telecommunications
industry. We believe our proposed merger will create a powerful competitor in this
dynamic, emerging market.
BELL ATLANTIC CORP., REGISTRATION STATEMENT ON FORM S-4 1-1(1999) [hereinafter BELL
ATLANTICIGTE FORM S-4] (for GTE merger). AT&T/TCI made a similar statement on their
Form S-4:
Because it is widely anticipated that substantial numbers of long-distance customers will
seek to purchase local, long-distance and other services from a single carrier as part of a
combined or full-service package, AT&T believes that the ability to offer all such services
at competitive rates using its own facilities will be increasingly important
AT&T/TCI FORM S-4, supra note 82, at 31. Cf Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in
the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REv. 61, 99-100 (2000) (discussing the
difficulty of courts spotting cognitive biases in their own decision-making).
94See CHAsE/J.P. MORGAN FORM S-4, supra note 79, at 28 ("The combined company
would be broadly diversified across a number of wholesale and retail financial services
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quo bias intertwine in a presentation indicating that the finns share a compatible,
but risky, strategy and that the mega-merger thus allows them to share the risk.9
Five transactions that are more clearly acquisitions, as opposed to mega-
mergers-of-equals, have a middle characterization of loss aversion and status quo
bias, although the categorization is subjective because the cases are close. These
transactions are the AT&T/MediaOne, Dow Chemical/Union Carbide, and
Lucent/Ascend mergers in 1999 and the Citigroup/Associates and
Verisign/Network mergers in 2000. The middle designation is given because the
target's status quo bias is downplayed. The target firm must be subsumed into the
acquirer for the benefit of target shareholders, and the acquirer simply talks about
the merger as a continuation of its strategy-a presentation that is not necessarily
as psychologically compelling.96 In similar circumstances, however, the
characterization can be "strong" when both the loss aversion to the target and the
merger as a continuation of the acquirer's strategy (status quo bias) are stressed.97
Yet other acquisition-oriented mega-mergers emphasize the status quo bias for
different reasons.98
businesses. This diversification would be expected to provide a more stable revenue stream
through changing economic cycles and volatile securities markets."); FIRSTAR/U.S. BANcoRP
FORM S-4, supra note 83, at 23 (explaining both boards' support for the merger because of,
inter alia:
[O]ur expectation that the combined company would benefit from significantly greater
scale than either Firstar or U.S. Bancorp separately in its consumer banking, commercial
banking, asset management, payment systems and in other high-growth specialty
businesses, from a more diversified revenue stream and from leveraging Firstar's business
model through the U.S. Bancorp franchise, including its faster-growing retail markets[.]).
95See BELL ATLANTICIGTE FORM S-4, supra note 93, at 1-25 ("The merger also mitigates
the risks, capital outlays and deployment times that would be required for GTE and Bell
Atlantic to develop these complementary assets and capabilities independently.").
9See, e.g., AT&T CORP., REGISTRATION STATEMENT ON FORM S-4 1-6 (1999)
[hereinafter AT&TIMEDIAONE FORM S-4] (for MediaOne merger); CrnGROUP/AssOcMTES
FORM S-4, supra note 83, at 1; VERISIGN, INC., REGISTRATION STATEMENT ON FORM S-4 38
(2000) [hereinafter VERiSIGN/NETWORK SOLUTIONS FORM S-4] (for Network Solutions
merger). A common notion among investment bankers and business people, however, is that
every mega-merger involves an acquirer and a target, despite the window dressing of the
merger-of-equals. See Carey, supra note 51, at 154 ("Of course, most mergers are really
acquisitions.").
97See, e.g., BP AMOCO/ARCO SCHEDULE 14A, supra note 80, at 27 ("ARCO's
management and board of directors also determined that ARCO, as a smaller international oil
company with relatively higher leverage than its competitors, had more limited ability to
aggressively pursue new capital intensive opportunities."); id. at 31 (BP observed that the
combination "will diversify its portfolio intemationally, bolster or extend its strategic position in
key areas, and significantly increase its options for growth").
98See AT&T/TCI FORM S-4, supra note 82, at 8-9 (describing how part of the acquired
businesses, such as Liberty Media, will be operated separately); PFIZER/WARNER-LAMBERT




Acting under this bias, people do not like extremes and tend to select the
middle strategy or outcome when they are presented with several choices in their
decision-making. In mega-merger decision-making, the decision to do a
transaction would be psychologically compelling if it was seen under extremeness
aversion as a balanced or middle response to the circumstances facing a firm,
such as industry shocks or consolidation. One obvious path or extreme is for each
firm not to do any transaction and to remain independent responding to industry
circumstances by itself. The other extreme is for each firn to engage in another
merger, whether an actual alternative or a future proposal. This would leave the
middle, reasonable choice as the mega-merger in question. It should be
emphasized that the presence of this bias does not mean that the extremes were
seriously considered in the decision-making; indeed, extremeness aversion can
give the decision-maker the feeling that he or she has examined the alternatives
without ever seriously considering them. 99
Admittedly, law may both support and undercut the presence and strength of
this bias in merger decision-making. Under the business judgment rule of
corporate law, a board of directors must gather information when evaluating a
transaction, and one reasonable source of information would come from a
consideration of alternative strategies.'0° Under both federal securities law and the
state corporate law duty of disclosure, a company's board must disclose any
concrete alternative strategy to the shareholders.' 1 The obligation to consider, and
even to seek out, alternatives is required if a change of control of the firm is
occurring.' 2 A board, however, is under no legal obligation to describe in detail
reassure the target's employees where Pfizer broke up a merger-of-equals between Warner-
Lambert and American Home Products). The same strong characterization applies to the
GE/Honeywell merger, where GE broke up the merger-of-equals between United Technologies
and GE and, in a very curious move, the Honeywell board negotiated for the continuation of
GE's famous manager Jack Welch, who was otherwise planning to retire. See GE/HoNEYWELL
FORM S-4, supra note 85, at 19-21.
99See JANIS, supra note 42, at 244.
'O'See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 882-88 (Del. 1985) (describing how
directors of a target failed to meet their duty of care, and thus do not receive "business
judgment" protection, by neglecting to do a "market test" of alternative transactions).
IOISee In re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 511 U.S. 1017 (1994) ("Rather, we hold that when a corporation is pursuing a specific
business goal and announces that goal as well as an intended approach for reaching it, it may
come under an obligation to disclose other approaches to reaching the goal when those
approaches are under active and serious consideration."); see infra Part VI.
1m For the classic statement, see Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network, 637
A.2d 34,48 (Del. 1993) ("Accordingly, when a corporation undertakes a transaction which will
cause: (a) a change in corporate control; or (b) a break-up of the corporate entity, the directors'
obligation is to seek the best value reasonably available to the stockholders.").
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or emphasize alternatives that it has rejected and can devote most attention to
promoting the transaction that it recommends.0 3
The information in Tables 1-4 reflects both the presence and strength of this
bias. If the bias is clearly present and the firms emphasize it, even only with
respect to the choices of one merger partner (usually the target), the transaction
receives a strong designation. If the bias exists in full form, with reference to
extremes and the reasonable middle choice, but is not particularly emphasized,
the merger has a middle designation. Finally, if a transaction makes a passing
description of the merger as a choice among alternatives, it receives a weak
rating. The italics in Tables 2-4 signal the merger partner or partners for which
the "extremeness aversion" is particularly pronounced. Under this
characterization, eleven transactions receive a strong and fourteen a middle
characterization (see Table 1).
Narratives about the background to the merger, a standard section in the
Form S-4 or F-4, typically highlight the extremes of "no transaction" or "other
mergers.' '1 4 The following remark, which has both a rational choice 05 and an
"'o'See infra Part VI.
'°4See, e.g., AOL/TIME WARNER FORM S-4, supra note 92, at 37 (Time Warner's board
explains that it "had explored alternatives to the proposed combination of Time Warner and
America Online, including the internal development of an Internet distribution infrastructure
and growth through acquisitions."); BELL ATLANTIC/GTE FORM S-4, supra note 93, at 1-19-20
("In the last several years, GTE's management has considered alternative strategies, including
those based upon remaining independent and developing new business opportunities utilizing
GTE's existing resources and assets, as well as alternatives based upon a combination with one
or more telecommunications or data companies.'). The DEUTsCHE TELECOM/VOICESTREAM
FORM F-4 provides the following full presentation of the extremes with the middle ground as
the final (reasonable) alternative:
Representatives of VoiceStream's management and VoiceStream's financial and
legal advisors made presentations regarding the various strategic alternatives available to
VoiceStream, including (I) continuing as an independent entity and entering into strategic
financing or business arrangements with other industry participants or financing sources
that would assist VoiceStream in financing its business strategy, (2) pursuing one or more
significant acquisitions of other wireless telecommunications companies and (3) entering
into a combination with Deutsche Telekom or the third party that had submitted the
preliminary proposal on July 7, 2000, as orally modified by its financial advisors on July
19,2000.
DEUrrSCHE TELECOM/VOICESTREAM FORM F-4, supra note 82, at 58; see also ARCO/BP
AMOCO SCHEDULE 14A, supra note 80, at 28 (describing how ARCO decided to find a
merger partner, hired an investment banker, shopped itself around, and despite other bids
from Exxon, Royal Dutch Shell, and other unnamed partners, "conclude[d] that [another
merger] could not realize as great a degree of strategic fit, potential for application of best
practices and level of cost savings as a combination with BP Amoco"); id. at 29 (giving
the price of a Competing offer).
105That is, as a general strategic matter, acquisitions and mergers are a common, rational
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extremeness aversion origin, is common here (with appropriate modification for
the industry): management of both companies "have, over time, regularly
considered the possibility of acquisitions and strategic combinations with a
variety of financial institutions and their potential strategic fit with such
institutions based on the businesses conducted thereby, their management and
employee cultures and the geographic location and breadth of their businesses."'
' 06
Because so many of the mega-mergers emphasize industry consolidation, myopia
tends to lead to an expression of extremeness aversion. That is, in a consolidating
industry, the alternative of remaining "single" is raised, but quickly dismissed,
while the possibility of combinations with other merger partners is mentioned.107
As is clear from the italics in Tables 2-4, moreover, the extremeness aversion
focus is generally on the target firm) °s An equal focus on the acquirer and target
may occur, however, in an industry with widespread consolidation and mega-
mergers-of-equals.' 9 And some of the strongest examples of the bias arise in a
mega-merger that arose from competitive bidding. In these cases, a specific
alternative to the mega-merger must be described and its rejection justified."0
way of expanding a business, and any transaction must be evaluated against what can be
achieved purely through a firm's internal growth.
'°
6See, e.g., BANC ONE CORP., REGSTRATION STATEMENT ON FORM S-4 22 (1998)
[hereinafter BANC ON&E/IsT CHICAGO FORM S-4] (for First Chicago merger).
1OTSee, e.g., AT&T/MEDIAONE FORM S-4, supra note 96, at 1-7 (MediaOne was
concerned about needing a merger partner;, in the reasons for the merger, it cites "current
industry trends, including the likelihood of continuing consolidation and increasing competition
in the cable television and broadband industries, and the corresponding decrease in the number
of suitable or available merger partners for MediaOne Group"). Mobil justified its merger with
Exxon bynoting:
[T]he risks and potential rewards associated with, as an alternative to the merger,
continuing to execute Mobil's strategic plan as an independent entity. Such risks include,
among others, the risks associated with remaining independent amidst industry-wide
consolidation, and such rewards include, among others, the ability of existing Mobil
shareholders to partake in the potential future growth and profitability of Mobil).
EXXON/MOBIL FORM S-4, supra note 83, at 1-24 (emphasis added).
0' There is likely to be a rational, as well as quasi-rational, justification for this, as when a
long-standing and well-known firm is being subsumed in another. The disappearing firm's
board feels particularly compelled to justify the change in the firm's existence, despite the
board's assertion, under the status quo bias, that nothing is changing! See, e.g.,
NORWEST/WELLS FARGO FORM S-4, supra note 83, at 22-25 (describing Wells Fargo's
decision, despite its ability to stay independent, to join with another firm).
109See DAIMLERICHRYSLERFORM F-4, supra note 91, at 49,58.
"
0See, e.g., PFIZE/ARNER-LAMBERT FORM S-4, supra note 81, at 1-25-33 (discussing
Wamer-Lambert's proposed mega-merger-of-equals with American Home Products, the then
possible bid by Proctor & Gamble, and finally, the merger with Pfizer); QwEsT/US WEST
FORM S-4, supra note 81, at 1-10-18 (where Qwest prevails over Global Crossing while itself
pursuing other acquisitions); MCI WORLDCOM/SPRINT FORM S-4, supra note 87, at 39-45
(discussing Sprint's consideration of other merger partners). Of course, given that these
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A merger is sometimes qualified as unique, with the statement or suggestion
that other transactions do not fit into this category and the alternative of not doing
the merger involves unreasonably foregoing this special opportunity. 1 ' The stated
uniqueness of the transaction will occasionally push into the background an




It is not surprising that the data set shows considerable presence of over-
optimism, for this bias is both one of the classic explanations for value-decreasing
mergers and a characteristic of healthy human beings.'13 Given the statistics on
the failure of most mergers, CEOs, board members, and shareholders of merging
firms must indeed be "over-optimistic" to think that their transaction will
succeed."14 Indeed, CEOs will acknowledge the validity of statistics about poorly
performing mergers, but they will argue that their transaction is special or will
assert, with little support, that the studies do not apply to their corporations." s
transactions often generate litigation from shareholders who argue that the target board did not
select the best deal, the firms' lawyers write the section on the merger's background with an eye
to existing or potential lawsuits.
"'See, e.g., DAIMLER/CHRYSLER FoRM F-4, supra note 91, at 52 ("[T]he Chrysler Board
believed that a combination with Daimler-Benz represented a unique strategic opportunity for
Chrysler and its stockholders, who could continue to participate as stockholders in the
combined company.... Therefore, the Chrysler Board did not seek a transaction with any other
company."); NATIONSBANK/BANKAMERICA FORM S-4, supra note 83, at 41 (referring to the
transaction as "a unique opportunity to create a premier financial services company with a truly
national banking franchise").
"
2There are only five such characterizations in the data set: AT&T/TCI and
Travelers/Citicorp in 1998; Dow/Union Carbide and Viacom/CBS in 1999; and Clear
Channel/AMFM in 2000. See, eg., TRAVELERS/CICORP FORM S-4, supra note 82, at 19
('Travelers and Citicorp have a unique opportunity to take advantage of the complementary
strategic fit of their businesses, combining Citicorp's and Travelers' products to create one of
the largest, most diversified financial services companies in the world, with growth
opportunities not available to either company on its own."). This view led to a weak
characterization for extremeness aversion in their 1998 merger. See supra Table 2.




5 See Jeffrey Ball et al., Grinding Gears: For Two Car Giants, A Megamerger Isn't The
Road to Riches, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27,2000, at Al (describing how Daimler had internal studies
done that showed the failure of most mega-mergers but went ahead anyway with the Chrysler
merger). Dennis Carey cites the following remarks of Alex Mandl, Chairman and CEO of
Teligent:
I would take issue with the idea that most mergers end up being failures. I know there are
studies from the 1970s and '80s that will tell you that. But when I look at many companies
today-particularly new-economy companies like Cisco and WorldCom-I have a hard
time dismissing the strategic power of M&A.
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Over-optimism is pervasive in the mega-mergers, even coloring a seemingly
neutral assessment of the likely growth of the two companies following the
merger, because growth will happen if everything goes right (which it rarely
does).
A mega-merger receives a strong characterization if over-optimism is
particularly stressed and approaches the hyperbolic (11). In the middle category,
the bias is clearly present but not over-emphasized (13). For the weak category,
the over-optimism, while present is either balanced by emphasis on what might
cause the transaction to fail or, in a rare case, is understated or absent (6). As with
all of the psychological factors, the categorization of each mega-merger on over-
optimism is a question of judgment, particularly about assigning a transaction to
either the strong or middle categories.
In the "strong" characterization, parties dwell upon the synergies from and
exaggerate the unique nature of the transaction. The AOL/Time Warner mega-
merger is exemplary in this regard because the parties projected $1 billion in first-
year synergies and boasted that the new company "will create a preeminent global
company that for the first time, will fully integrate traditional and new media and
communications businesses and technologies.""n 6 In many of the examples, there
is certainly a rational justification intertwined with the over-optimistic
presentation, such as the need to convince finance professionals that a particular
deal in a consolidating industry is the right one;" 7 to overcome the concern of
Carey, supra note 51, at 146. See Martin Lipton, Mergers: Past, Present and Future 10 (Jan. 10,
2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (famous takeover lawyer makes the
following incredible statement, unsupported by and contradictory to all finance data: "Most
academic studies of mergers argue that a majority of mergers are not beneficial to the acquiring
company.... The overwhelming majority of negotiated strategic mergers that I have been
involved in over a 45-year period were successful for the acquiring company.").
n6See AOL/TIME WARNER FORM S-4, supra note 92, at 33-35. The Chase/JP Morgan
transaction is similarly characterized:
The proposed merger will create one of the largest and most globally diversified
financial services companies in the world, with approximately $660 billion in assets and
over $36 billion in stockholders' equity, and will provide us with a unique opportunity to
leverage our premier brands and comprehensive capabilities across an unparalleled client
franchise. We believe that the combined company, which will be named J.P. Morgan
Chase & Co., will be a formidable competitor in financial services, positioned for superior
growth and profitability in the rapidly changing financial services industry.
CHAsE/J.P. MORGAN FORM S-4, supra note 79, at 1; TRAvELERS/CnTCORP FORM S-4, supra
note 82, at 19 (referring to joint reasons for the merger: "Travelers and Citicorp have a unique
opportunity to take advantage of the complementary strategic fit of their businesses, combining
Citicorp's and Travelers' products to create one of the largest, most diversified financial
services companies in the world, with growth opportunities not available to either company on
its own.").
117See, e.g., MCI WORLDCOM/SPRNT FORM S-4, supra note 87, at 59-61 (describing
detailed cost and capital savings, as well as revenue benefits, from merger); QWEST/US WEST
FORM S-4, supra note 81, at 1-17-18 (discussing how the mega-merger will allow the combined
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regulators in an industry like financial services where mega-mergers have
previously been rare;"' or to convince employees and local communities that a
cross-border transaction will not result in unacceptable changes to them." 9 In
short, the bias is also motivating the mega-merger decision-making.
In the middle category, over-optimism is expressed and the positive
projections of cost savings or revenue enhancements are given without hyperbole.
For example, AT&T offered a highly optimistic view of its combination of cable
with long distance in its merger with MediaOne in 1999,120 Citigroup pointed to
the uniqueness of its transaction with Associates First Capital,' 2' and Dow
discussed in detail the synergies in its mega-merger with Union Carbide.12
firm to become one of the "top-tier" of the telecommunications industry and realize revenue
synergies of $12 billion); Press Release, MCI Worldom/Sprint, MCI Worldcom and Sprint
Create Pre-Eminent Global Communications Company for the 21st Century (Oct. 5, 1999), at
http://www3.sprint/com/PR (Oct. 5, 1999) (stating that "merger creates the pre-eminent global
communications company for the 21 st century-a dramatically more effective competitor').
""See, e.g., NATIONSBANKiBANKAMERICA FORM S-4, supra note 83, at 2 ("The merger
will create the first coast-to-coast United States banking franchise, under the name
'BankAmerica Corporation.' We believe the merger will provide the combined company with
unprecedented capabilities in serving individuals, businesses and corporate, institutional and
governmental clients across the nation and around the world."). Firstar and U.S. Bancorp
voiced a similar sentiment:
We are creating the industry leader in growth, performance and diversification. The
combined companies will have a multitude of high growth, non-banking businesses as
well as an enviable banking franchise in attractive growth markets. We're already two of
the most efficient banking franchises in the country, so we can quickly devote our attention
to enhancing our customer relationships, integrating our businesses, and remaining the low
cost provider in our key business areas. The new U.S. Bancorp will be the leader in service
quality and financial performance.
Press Release, Firstar/U.S. Bancorp, Firstar and U.S. Bancorp Merge, Creating $160
Billion High-Growth Financial Services Company (Oct. 4, 2000), at
http://www.corporate-it.net/ireye/irsite.zhtml (Oct. 4,2000).
"
9 See, e.g., DAIMLER/CHRYSLER FORM F-4, supra note 91, at 51 ('The opportunities for
significant synergies afforded by a combination of Chrysler and Daimler-Benz-based not on
plant closings or lay-offs, but on such factors as shared technologies, distribution, purchasing
and know-how."). But see DEUrSCHE TELEKOMVOICESTREAM FORM F-4, supra note 82, at
59-60 (downplaying optimism in a cross-border merger).
12See AT&T/MEDIAONE FORM S-4, supra note 96, at 31 ("AT&T believes the Merger
will redefine the communications industry landscape.").
"'See CmGROu/AssOcIATEs FORM S-4, supra note 83, at 19 ('The merger presents
Citigroup with a unique opportunity to enhance stockholder value by taking advantage of a
highly complementary strategic fit for Citigroup with a partner that will strengthen even further
Citigroup's leading position in the global financial services industry.").
'2See DoW/UNION CARBIDE FORM S-4, supra note 84, at 22 (explaining that the merger
will achieve "$250 million in synergies in the first year following the merger and $500 million
in synergies per year thereafter").
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However, references to possible negative results balance the optimism.2 3
A mega-merger in the weak category reveals over-optimism but also
highlights the risks of the transaction. 24 The cautionary language has a legal
origin. SEC rules require disclosure of risk factors, and firms in certain industries,
such as high technology, gas, and electrical utilities, may have considerable risks
that need to be revealed and emphasized.12 5 Moreover, if federal securities law
requires disclosure in an SEC document to include language cautioning the reader
that the forward-looking statements may not be realized, the language will
generally protect those responsible for the preparation of the document from
liability under such law.126 This law and SEC rules thus encourage lawyers
involved in drafting the documents to play down or balance the over-optimism.
However, a valid question is whether the discussion of risk factors or the
cautionary language actually balances the over-optimism. While the warnings
may be legally adequate, they are designed to provide additional information, not
to negate the over-optimism. SEC disclosure documents do not speculate about
and quantify what would happen if the transaction does not work out-actions
that might have some force in negating the over- optimism.127 Although a reader
might figure out that the merger projections might not be realized if the
transaction fails, he or she would find it difficult to deduce from a typical Form S-
4 other potential negative consequences of the transaction, such as costs incurred
in attempting to combine the firms' operations or the loss of the new firm's
business because of competitors taking advantage of its disarray. A categorization
of a merger as "middle" and "weak" on over-optimism might thus underestimate
23Id. at 14 (quantifying costs and expenses resulting from the merger, with estimates of
$75 million of transaction costs and one-time costs of $200-400 million, and then offering the
following overarching qualification: "There can be no assurance that the combined company
will not incur additional charges to reflect costs associated with the merger.").24See, e.g., EL PASO/COASTAL FORM S-4, supra note 85, at 5 ("We believe that by
combining the highly complementary assets and operations of El Paso and Coastal, we will
create a company that will be the leading integrated natural gas and power company in North
America and will have tremendous opportunities for growth and creation of stockholder
value."); id. at 19-25 (including six pages discussing risks and mentioning reasons why the
merger could fail); CLEAR C1IANNEIAMFM FORM S-4, supra note 84, at 1-18-24 (explaining
that the combined company will have significant debt and describing the other problems with.
the merger). The GE/Honeywell merger displays a very understated optimism. See
GEHONEYWELL FORM S-4, supra note 85. Could the renowned master CEO and acquirer, Jack
Welch, know something about how to achieve a successful merger (i.e., don't promise too
much) even if he had later to abandon the transaction because of antitrust problems?
125'ee Form S-4, supra note 58, at Item 3 (cross-referencing to 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c)
(2001)) ("Where appropriate, provide under the caption 'Risk Factors' a discussion of the most
significant factors that make the offering speculative or risky.").
26See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (1994).
17See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 44, at 721 ("The point is critical, for people display
much less eagerness to obtain particular benefits when they gain awareness of the
corresponding costs.").
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the presence of this bias in mega-mergers.
5. Anchoring Heuristic
Under this heuristic, or shortcut way of decision-making, people decide on
the basis of a value or "anchor" that may be arbitrarily chosen, often because it is
"available" or strongly present to the mind. People then hold fast to this anchor,
despite the presence of rational values. Evidence of other psychological factors,
such as myopia or loss aversion, also supports this heuristic. For example, in a
particular industry a specific mega-merger is the immediate justification for a
firm's own mega-merger and the transaction against which all other similar deals
are measured. For Tables 1-4, however, the characterization of the anchoring
heuristic uses other, more limited evidence, the most common being the price
from comparable transactions. A strong rating is given to mergers that include the
price reference as well as some other value to which the transaction is anchored
(13). The middle category contains mergers that generally focus only on the price
value (16), and the weak group (1) finds little or no value anchoring.
The reliance of both firms upon prices paid in comparable transactions is
generally based upon the fairness opinions of investment bankers that provide
such data and in which they opine on the fairness of the merger price to their
client firm. There are, of course, rational reasons for this reliance. As a legal
matter, a company's board puts itself into a better legal position by using an
investment banker that reviews the transaction and its price in comparison to
similar transactions. 128 Moreover, it would be irrational, absent a serious change
in market circumstances, not to rely upon recent deal prices, which appear to
reflect investors' current attitudes towards and valuations of similar
combinations.'29 Mobil's statement in its reasons for the merger with Exxon that
"the value of the exchange ratio ... relative to the stock price premiums paid in
mergers of comparable size... that the premium offered in the merger was within
the range of premiums paid in comparable transactions" is thus typical. 30 Indeed,
so common is this reliance upon values in comparable transactions that it is
unusual when the firms do not provide them.131 Again, the assignment of a mega-
merger to the strong as opposed to the middle category depends upon other
examples of anchoring, such as the reliance (chiefly, but not exclusively, by the
'2 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 882-88 (Del. 1985).
19 As a cognitive matter, it is likely that both merging firms and their bankers depend upon
socially constructed models of what they consider to be comparable firms. Accordingly, prices
paid in transactions involving these firms become the "anchor" against which they measure
their own deal. See Porac & Thomas, supra note 78, at 237.
'30 See ExxoN/MOBIL FORM S-4, supra note 83, at 1-24.
131 Travelers/Citicorp is the one example in the data, for there were no fairness opinions
given. However, both firms had internal investment banking operations that could have
provided information on comparable transactions to their boards.
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target) on the previous merger or acquisition success of one or both firms as a
justification for the merger132 or the highlighting of the "standard" nature of the
features of the transaction.
133
6. Availability Heuristic, Framing Effects, and Hindsight Bias
Tables 1-4 make no reference to other psychological factors, such as the use
of the availability heuristic, framing effects, and hindsight bias. One concern here
was to avoid duplicate presentations of data, a concern mentioned under
"anchoring" above. The availability heuristic, for example, posits that people act
upon, and attribute importance to, events or values present to their minds. Signs in
the data showing the presence of this heuristic would also reveal myopia, loss
aversion, and anchoring. For the same reason, no separate listing for framing
effects is provided. Examples of its use appear under loss aversion and
extremeness aversion, which are triggered by how the decision is "framed" or
presented. Hindsight bias is simply absent from the data. Because the bias
12See, e.g., AOI.TIME WARNER FORM S-4, supra note 92, at 33. AOL's merger with
Time Waner was justified as follows:
The [AOL] board of directors also took note of the fact that the merger is with a long-time
business partner of America Online with a proven history of successful collaborations,
including cross-promotion and marketing activities between the two companies. Both
companies also have management teams with demonstrated ability to manage the
integration process of major business combinations.
Id; Press Release, Firstar/U.S. Bancorp, supra note 118 (with Firstar emphasizing that it has
been good at integrating companies in the past: "In each previous merger integration, we've
achieved our operating goals on time and on budget"); see also BANC ONE/FIRST CHICAGO
FORM S-4, supra note 106, at 26 (Bane One took into account "the fact that the managements of
both Bane One and FCN had demonstrated the ability to successfully integrate substantial
acquisitions in a timely manner."); EL PAsO/COASTAL FORM S-4, supra note 85, at 28 ("Based
on El Paso's experience in its past business combinations, including its merger with Sonat Inc.
and its acquisition of Tenneco Inc.'s energy business, we believe the combined company may
achieve annual cost savings in excess of $200 million."); SBC/AMERrrECH FORM S-4, supra
note 79, at 24 ("In addition, the Ameritech Board considered the demonstrated ability of SBC's
management to successfully integrate and obtain synergistic benefits from previous SBC
acquisitions, most notably SBC's acquisition of Pacific Telesis Group.").
'
33 See, eg., BP/AMOCO SCHEDULE 14A, supra note 83, at 29 (rationalizing their deal
protection devices in this way "This [Stock Option Agreement] and the termination fees
contemplated by the Merger Agreement evidenced the parties' commitment to the business
combination between them and the parties believed that they were customary features of
transactions of this nature involving United States companies."); CLEAR CHANNEJAMFM
FORM S-4, supra note 84, at 1-29 (in the AMFM board meeting, counsel explains to the board
that "the amount of the termination fees in the merger agreement were appropriate under
Delaware law based on advice of Delaware legal counsel, which based its advice on its review
and knowledge of the level of ternination fees associated with similar Delaware transactions in
regulated industries that had been held enforceable!).
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involves re-predicting a past event from a present standpoint (i.e., coming to
believe that a past outcome was more predictable than in fact it was), it is unlikely
to play a role in a present merger decision about the future of two firms.
34
C. Value Destruction in the Mega-Mergers
One assumption of the article is that there is likely to be a causal relation
between the exercise of the psychological factors in mega-merger decision-
making and the value destruction for shareholders that so frequently results from
the transactions. If mergers were generally successes, it would not be worth
examining the factors, except as a way of improving decision-making at the
margin. Available systematic, rather than anecdotal, 135 data on the mega-mergers
in this study establish that they too follow the expected pattern of value
destruction for shareholders. Although a full account on their success or failure
from the shareholder value perspective has to await future work by financial
economists, studies of past transactions indicate that a merger's bad outcome
generally worsens the longer the time period from the decision date that an
analyst uses to measure its financial results.1
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A survey of mega-mergers by The Wall Street Journal, completed on
October 27, 2000, covering many of the same transactions as are in this article's
data set, provides evidence of their value destruction.137 The writers compared the
price of the acquirer's stock on the day prior to the announcement of the
transaction with the price on October 27, 2000, and computed its percentage
increase/decrease. They then computed the percentage change, for the same
period, for (1) the Standard & Poor's 500 Index and (2) an appropriate industry
index for a merger. Of the eighteen transactions that were in both of our data sets,
thirteen had under-performed the S&P 500 Index and twelve had under-
performed the applicable industry index.
138
To tailor a valuation study to this article's data set, I conducted an analysis
similar to the one performed by The Wall Street Journal reporters. In the analysis,
I computed the percentage change in the value of the acquirer's shares from the
1341 owe this clarification to Professor Jeffrey Rachlinski.
135 For some of the anecdotal data, see Fanto, supra note 10, at 272-74.
136See id at 256-57.
137 Steven Lipin & Nikhil Deogun, Big Mergers of '90s Prove Disappointing to
Shareholders, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2000, at C21. I am grateful to Professor Jeffrey Gordon of
Columbia University School of Law for giving me a copy of the spreadsheet used to prepare the
article, which he obtained from its authors.
.. Completed M&A Deals Involving U.S. Targets and Greater Than $15 Billion-
1/1/97-10/27/2000 (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). The differences
between the data set in The Wall Street Journal article and that in this article appear to arise
from the use by The Wall Street Journal authors of cash, as well as stock, transactions and their




closing price on the last trading day before announcement of the merger, as
reported in the acquirer's Form S-4, Form F-4, or Schedule 14A, to a recent
closing price.139 As in the case of The Wall Street Journal study, I adjusted the
pre-merger stock price for any subsequent stock splits. 140 I then compared this
percentage change with the percentage change over the same period for a Dow
Jones industry index appropriate for the acquirer in a given merger.141 Because in
my view this industry-specific comparison would better reflect the relative
performance of an acquirer's stock, I did not compare this performance to the
results of a general, diversified stock index, as The Wall Street Journal reporters
had done.
Tables 5-7 provide the results of this analysis, indicating the positive or
negative performance of an acquirer's stock in relation to the industry index.
Table 5 provides the kind of results that, from a conservative perspective on the
basis of data from past transactions, one would expect from the mega-mergers in
the study: at least half of the transactions have lost value in comparison to a
transaction's index. Admittedly, two cases, both involving oil companies, are
close calls. At best, these transactions are neutral, leaving again half of the
transactions as failures with respect to stock price performance if the 1998 data set
is reduced to eight mergers. Some of the failures have been well publicized
(AT&T/TCI, Banc One/First Chicago, Daimler/Chrysler, NationsBank/Bank
America) and may reach catastrophic proportions.142 The successes are
concentrated in "Baby Bell" telecommunications companies and in financial and
oil company mergers. 143
139 The closing price used was that reported in INTERACTIVE WALL ST. J., Feb. 20,2001, at
http'//www.wsj.com (last visited Aug. 19,2001).
140 For example, if, subsequent to the pre-merger date, the acquirer's stock split with two
shares issued for every existing share, its current stock price would need to be compared to an
adjusted, comparable pre-merger stock price (i.e., the pre-merger stock price would have to be
divided by two). See id.
141 The industry index used was a Dow Jones industry index provided in the stock chart of
each acquirer in The Interactive Wall Street Journal, supra note 139, which supplies an
appropriate industry index for each stock. I had to approximate each index's value on the pre-
merger date from a chart providing the index's value over the relevant period. This
approximation was adequate for the goal of this exercise: to obtain a rough sense of the
comparative performance of an acquirer following a mega-merger. See INTERACTIVE WALL ST.
J., supra note 139.
142 See, e.g., Diana B. Henriques, Bank ofAmerica to Cut Up to 6.7% of Work Force, or
10,000 Jobs, N.Y. TIMEs, July 29, 2000, at Cl; Amy Merrick, Bank One Will Trim Size of
Board, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23,2000, at C1; Ma BellDoes the Splits, ECONOMIsT, Oct. 28,2000,
at 57; Brock Yates, Daimler Drives Chrysler into a Ditch, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2000, at A26.
143 See, e.g., Shawn Young, As Their Onetime Parent Falters, Four Bells Flourish, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 26,2000, atB1.
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Table 6 shows worse results for the 1999 transactions, with seven out of ten
losing value. Again, if the somewhat close cases of Viacon!CBS and
AT&T/MediaOne are eliminated, the general outcome still stands-five out of
eight lose value. The failures here are not concentrated in any specific industry,
but are spread among the industries in which these large transactions occurred in
1999: broadcasting, insurance, oil, and telecommunications.144
Table 7 shows results similar to Tables 5 and 6. Seven out of ten transactions
destroyed shareholder value, with one being neutral. Again, there are some close
questions regarding transactions like ChevroniTexaco and the abandoned
GE/Honeywell merger, but their elimination would actually worsen the overall
results (i.e., six out of eight transactions would be negative). Even a firm such as
Citigroup that managed not to destroy value in its previous merger
(rravelers/Citicorp in 1998) has fallen into the negative after its mega-merger
with Associates.
'44 See, e.g., Catherine Arnst et al., Lucent: Clean Break Clean Slate?, BUS. WK., Nov. 6,
2000, at 176; Amy Barrett, Pfizer: How Big Is Too Big?, BUS. WK., Aug. 28,2000, at 216.
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The above stock performance data is by no means conclusive as to the value
destruction of the mega-mergers in the data set. No doubt financial economists
will study these mega-mergers within a larger group of transactions, measure the
performance of each merger over the same benchmark period and against several
indices, and perform the other verifications that their discipline prescribes in order
to, for instance, control for other variables in the results. Nevertheless, the above
performance tables, when coupled with studies of past mergers, anecdotal
evidence about the transactions, and reviews of recent merger performance, such
as The Wall Street Journal's, are highly indicative of the shareholder value
destruction resulting from many of these deals.
D. Linking the Psychological Factors to Value Destruction
It is important to look for correlations between the psychological factors in
the merger data set and the share price performance of the firms. With this
empirical data, one could point to potential psychological causes for good or poor
merger decision-making and could propose appropriate policy to deter the former
and encourage the latter. The data from the study in this article, however, does not
generally establish these correlations. If, using a rough effort to establish
correlations, one were to assign a number to the strength of a given psychological
factor (for example, a 3 for "strong," 2 for "middle," and 1 for "weak") and
compute a psychological factor average in each year for the positive- and
negative-value transactions, the computation does not indicate that negative-value
transactions reveal a greater presence and strength of psychological factors than
do positive-value deals. Aside from 1998, where the averages are almost
identical, in the other two years there is a higher "psychological" average for
positive-value transactions.145 In 1998 and 1999, moreover, transactions with the
highest presence and strength of the psychological factors are equally positive-
and negative-value ones. A comparative glance at Tables 1-7 supports this
conclusion about a lack of general correlation.
This result does not mean that there is no causal relation between the
psychological factors and good or poor merger decision-making. The
continuation of value-destroying mergers would intuitively suggest the
opposite. 146 Rather, more data on the decision-making is needed; the available
145 That is, using a "3, 2, 1" scale for "strong," "middle," and "weak," respectively, the
1998 averages are 13.75 for positive-value and 13.67 for negative-value transactions; 1999
averages are 14.33 for positive and 11.43 for negative; and the 2000 averages are 14.5 for
positive and 12.43 for negative. Tables 1-4 (for the psychological factors) were prepared before
Tables 5-7 (for shareholder value), which gives some objectivity to the computation. Again, the
above computation is rough. For example, the positive transactions in 1999 and 2000 are so few
that the "psychological average" for them is not very meaningful.
146 Of course, value-destroying mergers also likely owe much to rational, as opposed to
quasi-rational, causes (e.g., decision-makers make a rational choice that tums out simply to be
1380 [Vol. 62:1333
QUASI-RA TIONALITY INACTION
psychological data from this study requires further refinement and analysis so that
the causation can be established or disproved; and all the data needs to be
subjected (where possible and appropriate) to statistical analysis. For example, the
loss aversion category may be too general because it sweeps in related, but
slightly different, psychological motivations-"let's not change" (the status quo
bias) versus "let's change to keep our position and prevent loss" (the loss aversion
bias)-and one or the other motivation might be better correlated to good or poor
decision-making. Moreover, some psychological factors that are present in
merger decision-making and that lead to negative-value transactions may be
dampened in the article's data, as, for instance, where concern about legal liability
results in the highlighting of transaction risks and the downplaying of over-
optimism.
There are also intriguing indications in the article's data across the three years
that suggest some correlation and potentially a causal connection between the
psychological factors and the outcome of merger decision-making. More
negative-value transactions exhibit a strong myopia than do positive-value
transactions (9 to 6). The same results hold true for strong loss aversion (16 to 8),
strong extremeness aversion (6 to 5), strong over-optimism (6 to 4), and strong
anchoring (7 to 5). These indications suggest that more analysis of the data might
prove useful. Furthermore, the absence of any correlation or causal connection at
this stage does not undercut the important empirical results of the article, which
establish the presence and strength of the different kinds of psychological factors
in mega-merger decision-making, at least with respect to those in the data set, and
which thus at the very least help explain the psychological attractiveness and
momentum of these transactions.
VI. LEGAL COMMENTARY
A. The Law's Response to the Psychological Factors
Because the empirical results of the article show considerable presence and
strength of psychological factors or quasi-rationality in mega-merger decision-
making, it is important to ask how state corporate 147 and federal securities laws
deal with and accommodate this phenomenon. The simple answer is that, in
applying the law, courts ignore the complexity of psychological reality by
accepting a psychologically simplistic view of decision-making. Courts assume,
w r he focus is on Delaware corporate law, the most widely used jurisdiction of
incorporation of the major public companies that are of the kind involved in mega-mergers,
although the reason for Delaware law's popularity is in dispute. See, e.g., ROBERT DANES,
DOES DELAWARE LAW IMPROVE FIRM VALUE? 14 (Columbia L. Sch. Center for Studies in L.
and Econ., Working Paper No. 159, 2000) at http'//papers.ssm.com (Feb. 29, 2000) (arguing
that empirical evidence suggests that Delaware corporate law does improve value).
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particularly in mergers, that behavior is instrumentally rational. 148 Their
assumption is that CEOs and board members generally act rationally for the good
of the firm and the shareholders, and shareholders themselves act rationally for
their self-interest in deciding whether to vote for a merger.' 49 Indeed, Vice
Chancellor Strine echoed this judicial perspective when he explained why a claim
for corporate waste (i.e., that board members made a wasteful decision affecting
the corporation) should not survive an informed shareholder vote: "As a result, it
is difficult to imagine how elimination of the waste vestige will permit the
accomplishment of unconscionable corporate transactions, unless one presumes
that stockholders are, as a class, irrational and that they will rubber stamp
outrageous transactions contrary to their own economic interests.' 50
Under corporate law and equity jurisprudence, moreover, courts give
considerable deference to this presumed rationality of board decisions and intrude
upon them only where these corporate agents might be rationally tempted to
follow their own self-interest, typically defined in narrow terms pertaining to
financial gain, at the expense of either the corporation or the shareholders15' or
148 This view prevails regardless of whether one understands the law to establish rules or
set flexible "norms." See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate
Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1009, 1106 (1997) (arguing that, in their corporate law
decisions, Delaware courts do not establish hard and fast rules of behavior for boards of
directors, but cultivate general "norms" that set good and bad roles for parties to fill or avoid).
Professor Rock presumes that this court-promoted normative behavior is straightforwardly
rational. Id. at 1017.
149 The importance of the shareholder vote is further based on the judicial assumption that
shareholders have the right to dispose of their property as they see fit. See, e.g., In re Gaylord
Container Corp. Shareholders Litig., 747 A.2d 71, 78 (Del. Ch. 1999) ("In a capitalist nation
like ours, I would think it inarguable that an owner of stock has the right to sell her property,




°See Harbor Finance Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 899 (Del. Ch. 1999); see also
In re IXC Communications Inc. Shareholders Litig., No. 17324, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 210, at
*19 (Del. Ch. 1999) (explaining why, when making a merger decision, board members who
were large shareholders could not have been focused on the possibility of a later court
evaluation of that merger decision, as opposed to how much they would gain from the
transaction, the court writes:
I simply cannot accept a scenario that suggests that such a twisted self-interest could even
exist; namely, so intense a desire to avoid an artifice of perceived legal duties (duties
which in actuality this Court determines from the context, after the fact) that the directors
would actively shirk their fiduciary obligations and in the process ignore their own
economic self-interests.).
"' See, e.g., O'Reilly v. Transworld Healthcare, Inc., 745 A.2d 902, 913 (Del. Ch. 1999)
(allowing complaint to go forward with duty of loyalty claims where directors of target received
cash compensation in the merger or would have been penalized financially had the merger not
gone forward). On the restrictive definition of what constitutes a fiduciary's self-interest, see
Crescent v. Tumer, No. 17455, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 145, at *40-*41 (Sept. 29, 2000)
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where there is a rare showing of the irrational.152 Even the classic "intermediate"
("Second, plaintiffs assert that Turner dominated and controlled Hunt. In support, they allege
that Turner controls Hunt because of their long-standing, fifteen-year professional and personal
relationship. This allegation alone fails to raise a reasonable doubt that Hunt could not exercise
his independent business judgment in approving the transaction."); Solomon v. Armstrong, 747
A.2d 1098, 1117-18 (Del. Ch. 1999) (holding that self-interest is not legally present where
directors owned one class of stock, as opposed to another). When courts do intervene in board
decision-making because of concern that the corporate fiduciary's actions were motivated by
self-interest, however, they can be searching and critical in their analysis of a fiduciary's
behavior. See, e.g., Bomarko, Inc. v. International Telecharge, Inc., No. 13052, 1999 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 211 (Nov. 4, 1999) (court strongly condemns controlling shareholder who engineers
freeze-out merger in a deceptive way). Courts sometimes intervene when directors follow their
or others' interests for reasons that are not necessarily rational, but perhaps indirectly self-
interested. See, e.g., Harbor Finance Partners, 751 A.2d at 889 ("Close familial relationships
between directors can create a reasonable doubt as to impartiality.").
152 This intervention often appears when there is a hard-to-establish waste claim. See, e.g.,
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) ('To be sure, there are outer limits, but they
are confined to unconscionable cases where directors irrationally squander or give away
corporate assets."); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (citing
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717,720 (Del. 1971)); Ash v. McCall, No. 17132,2000
Del. Ch. LEXIS 144, at *28 (Del. Ch. 2000) ("Moreover, it is simply illogical to presume that
McKesson directors would knowingly cause McKesson to acquire a company with significant,
undisclosed earnings misstatements."); Leung v. Schuler, No. 17089, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS
134, at *14 (Sept. 29, 2000) ("If, however, there is any substantial goodfaith judgment that in
the circumstances the transaction is worthwhile, there should be no finding of waste, even if the
fact finder would conclude cc post that the transaction was unreasonably risky.") (emphasis
added); Harbor Finance Partners, 751 A.2d at 893 ("Rather, the fundamental basis for a waste
claim must rest on the pleading of facts that show that the economics of the transaction were so
flawed that no disinterested person of right mind and ordinary business judgment could think
the transaction beneficial to the corporation.") (emphasis added). But see Parnes v. Bally
Entertainment, 722 A.2d 1243, 1246-47 (Del. 1999) (finding a complaint about the behavior of
a target's CEO and his fellow directors in a merger, where CEO demanded a huge sum for the
transaction to proceed, to state a claim for violation of the business judgment rule); Crescent,
2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 145, at *45 (explaining how board members' lack of good faith
implicated duty of loyalty, the court writes:
In other words, it does not matter here that the Complaint fails to establish that Sweezey
and Hunt were either interested directors or that they lacked the ability to form an
independent judgment. Their approval of Turner's alleged self-interested "side-deals"
allegedly taint the entire merger process and strips the board of the protection of the
business judgment rule. Even though the remaining directors failed to benefit personally
from the merger, their judgments were aligned with that of Turner and not that of Holdings
or its minority stockholders.);
Hills Stores Co. v. Bozic, 769 A.2d 88, 109 (Del. Ch. 2000) (noting that courts would intervene
where a board acted with spite, but presuming that here board members were loyal to managers
who worked with company during its hard times following bankruptcy, the court writes:
Notably, this is not a situation where the plaintiffs have produced evidence that the board,
realizing it was going to be thrown out of office, triggered the Severance out of spite or
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standard of Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum, where the court scrutinizes the reasons for
a board's defensive actions towards an unwanted bid, is triggered only by a
judicial concern that board members may be focusing more on maintaining their
board positions than on shareholder interests in a takeover situation.
153
For the courts, a touchstone of the presumed board rationality is its orderly
gathering and processing of information, 54 which includes the board's reliance
upon experts' preparation and "digesting" of the information for the board. 55
Similarly with respect to a shareholder vote, courts hold that board members have
a duty of disclosure. Under this duty, they must give shareholders all material
information regarding a matter to be voted upon, such as a merger, that a rational
person would consider important. 56 Courts assume that a shareholder will be
hard feelings. Evidence that would support a finding that board members were sore losers
and took action out of a bad faith desire to exact revenge on the stockholders for voting the
wrong way would justify a trial to determine whether the board had violated its duty of
loyalty.);
Sander v. Wang, No. 16640, slip op. at 25-26 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8, 1999) (allowing claim to
proceed that directors violated their fiduciary duty in granting more shares under an executive
stock option plan than what the plan literally allowed).
153See Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995); Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985); In re Gaylord Container
Shareholders Litig., 753 A.2d 462,475 (Del. Ch. 2000).
154See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); see also Brehm, 746 A.2d
at 259. The Brehm court, in setting the standard for excuse of demand when a duty of care
violation is alleged, explains:
Presuit demand will be excused in a derivative suit only if the Court of Chancery in the
first instance, and this Court in its de novo review, conclude that the particularized facts in
the complaint create a reasonable doubt that the informational component of the directors'
decision-making process, measured by concepts of gross negligence, included
consideration of all material information reasonably available.
Id.; see also id. at 262 (reliance on expert reports); Gaylord, 753 A.2d at 479 ("Furthermore, the
Gaylord board engaged in a rational deliberative process to define the threat it faced, meeting
on two occasions and receiving detailed legal advice from a distinguished outside law firm?).
The corporate law bar assumes that this information-processing approach is the correct one to
address most problems affecting boards. See, e.g., Gregory V. Varallo & Srinivas M. Raju, A
Process Based Model for Analyzing Deal Protection Measures, 55 Bus. LAW. 1609, 1635-47
(2000) (arguing that the use of deal protection measures in merger contracts should be analyzed
by the courts on the basis of whether the board followed the correct process in negotiating
them). Yet cognition scholars consider this model of human information processing to be
flawed. See Walsh, supra note 43, at 307.
'sSee, e.g., Ash, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 144, at *30 ("What would plaintiffs have the
McKesson board do in the course of making an acquisition other than hire a national accounting
firm and investment bank to examine the books and records of the target company?').
156 Courts call such information "material information." See Skeen v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc.,
750 A.2d 1170, 1172 (Del. 2000) (citing Louden v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135,
142 (Del. 1997)); Zim v. VLI Corp., 681 A.2d 1050, 1056 (Del. 1996); Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil
Company, 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985) (citing TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426
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undistracted, will generally pay attention to the information given and weigh all
of it equally, will ignore, or discount, any exaggeration or "puffing," and will
generally be able to separate the facts from any such rhetorical embellishment.
15 7
In one of their few psychological insights regarding shareholder decision-making,
courts acknowledge that shareholders cannot absorb all information and that, as a
result, they should not be inundated with unimportant details that would deflect
them from consideration of key facts. 158 Indeed, if shareholders are fully informed
and then approve a merger, this ratification extinguishes any claim of, at a
minimum, a breach of the duty of care on the board's part for self-interested
behavior. It also transforms any duty of loyalty claim about board behavior,
absent the presence of a controlling shareholder, to one evaluated by courts under
the deferential business judgment rule. 59 Moreover, shareholders' access to
abundant information about firms has persuaded courts that they are on the right
track in restricting their analysis of shareholder decision-making to this
information processing.
16 °
U.S. 438 (1976) (adopting the TSC standard of materiality established under federal securities
law); Turner v. Berstein, No. 16190, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 96, at *32 (June 6, 2000) (finding
that "the defendant directors defaulted on this obligation [to disclose material facts in a merger]
and did not even attempt to put together a disclosure containing any cogent recitation of the
material facts pertinent to the stockholders' choice").
'7See In re Newell-Rubbermaid, No. 99-C-6853, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15190, at *19-
*20 (N.D. fI1. Oct. 4, 2000). Yet when courts suggest an underlying rationale for the
shareholder vote, they not only couch it in terms of economic and political freedom, but also
discuss its psychological implications! See, e.g., In re G.M. Class H Shareholders Litig., 734
A.2d 611, 621 (Del. Ch. 1999) (justifying a decision that upholds the freedom of shareholders
to choose whether to exchange their shares for other consideration, the court says: "But mature
societies like ours recognize that freedom's psychic costs are far outweighed by its emotional,
spiritual, communal, and economic benefits.").
151 See, e.g., TSCIndustries, Inc., 426 U.S. at 448. The Court states:
Some information is of such dubious significance that insistence on its disclosure may
accomplish more harm than good. The potential liability for a Rule 14a-9 violation can be
great indeed, and if the standard of materiality is unnecessarily low, not only may the
corporation and its management be subjected to liability for insignificant omissions or
misstatements, but also management's fear of exposing itself to substantial liability may
cause it simply to bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information-a result
that is hardly conducive to informed decisionmaking.
Id.; Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1130 (Del. Ch. 1999). Under federal securities
laws, as interpreted by courts, disclosure is generally limited to "material" information, a term
of art that is designed to eliminate from shareholder consideration (and thus to avoid
shareholder distraction regarding) insignificant information.
159 See, e.g., In re Lukens, Inc. Shareholders Litig., 757 A.2d 720,736-37 (Del. Ch. 1999);
Harbor Finance Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 900 (Del. Ch. 1999); Solomon, 747 A.2d
at 1113-17; In re Wheelabrator, Inc. Shareholders Litig., 663 A.2d 1194, 1203 (Del. Ch. 1995).
16°See Harbor Finance Partners, 751 A.2d at 901. The Delaware Chancery Court
explains:
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This article's empirical evidence of the psychological factors in merger
decision-making of boards, and potentially of shareholders, underscores that the
judicial view of rational decision-making is overly simplistic and does not
accurately reflect reality. This conclusion suggests that courts are basing their
analysis of disputes arising from merger decision-making on a one-sided,
incomplete, and inaccurate account of the process. Because courts are erecting the
law upon this defective foundation, the capability of their jurisprudence to address
adequately any problems arising in this kind of decision-making is seriously
called into question. A more accurate account of the role of quasi-rationality in
the process would appear to require a sustained review of, and potentially a
substantial revision to, corporate and securities law on the regulation of merger
decision-making.
Yet instead of undertaking this review, many legal scholars applying
psychological insights to the law have looked for ways of justifying, on
psychological grounds, the current deferential judicial review of business
decision-making. One justification involves the argument that, in a common sense
way, courts have taken the psychological factors into consideration in fashioning
the law. Professor Rachlinski, a prominent law and psychology scholar, argues
that the deferential attitude of the courts to boards and shareholders in their
decision-making shows that the courts are aware of their own inclination to be
affected by hindsight bias when reviewing a past business decision that clearly led
to a bad outcome. By the deferential business judgment rule, he contends, courts
guard against their exercise of the bias.'6
Related to this justification is the contention that, by their deference, judges
recognize, in a practical way, the psychological and other complexities of such
business decisions as mergers and accord considerable leeway to decision-makers
who must navigate amid this complexity. Thus, judges at least understand that
they could not make the business decisions any better than the actual players
did. 62 This is a kind of psychological rephrasing of the well-known concept of
the courts' recognition of their limited institutional competence. By their
deference, they acknowledge that they can sort out neither the business reasons
In this day and age in which investors also have access to an abundance of information
about corporate transactions from sources other than boards of directors, it seems
presumptuous and paternalistic to assume that the court knows better in a particular




6 1 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, in
BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICs, supra note 26, at 95, 110-11.162In a related vein, one could argue that the Unocal rule in Delaware jurisprudence could
be justified as a way of allowing directors of a target corporation to resist the psychological
pressures to take a bid ("myopia") by allowing them to draw back to consider other alternatives.
See Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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for merging nor the complex psychological and other factors affecting business
people in these difficult decisions. 63
Yet, as reasonable as this response is, it appears to be a psychological
apology for the status quo' 64 By relying upon a model of decision-making based
upon rationality, courts clearly ignore the influence of psychological factors in
decision-making, especially when they intervene only in the rare decision that
they can characterize as irrational.165 In addition, the stark contrast between the
rational and the irrational ignores the numerous ways in which psychological
factors are intertwined with rationality in the quasi-rationality. 166 And it is
163 On the limitation regarding judicial intrusiveness, see I AMERICAN LAW INSTTUTE,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 135 (1994); JAMES D. COX Er AL., CORPORATIONS
607 (1997).
164I owe this observation to Professor Christine Jolls. in a recent article, Professor
Rachlinski exhibits more skepticism about the psychological "optimality" of existing legal
rules. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics,
and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 748 (2000). The status quo bias in current
corporate law jurisprudence is also suggested (although on other grounds) by corporate law
scholars who believe that corporate law, including the law dealing with takeovers, is favorable
to corporate managers because those managers control incorporation decisions and decisions to
continue a firm's incorporation in a particular jurisdiction. But see Daines, supra note 147, at
12-15 (presenting evidence that Delaware corporate law increases market value of firms). See
generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to
Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168 (1999) (reviewing the arguments
for managerial influence on takeovers). My argument on the need for courts to acknowledge
psychological reality does not require that I take a position on these arguments, which go to the
relative value of current or possible corporate laws. See id. at 38 ("Nor do these results show
that Delaware law is better than a hypothetical Federal [sic] code or that all of Delaware's laws
are optimal.").
165 Professor Rachlinski points out that, apart from dealing with the hindsight bias, courts
generally are weak in recognizing and addressing the influence of psychological factors. See
Rachlinski, supra note 164, at 756. There are cases, however, particularly in the partnership
context, when courts show a kind of common sense appreciation of the psychological
background to a dispute. See, e.g., Juran v. Bron, No. 16464, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 143, at *9
(Oct. 6, 2000), where the Chancery Court states:
As noted above, personality differences between Bron and Juran have driven, and continue
to drive, this litigation. Their feud began during their tense and difficult negotiations
regarding the Employment Agreement and Partnership Agreement. Following the second
closing, an irreparable rift had developed between the two. It is apparent from record
evidence and the testimony at trial, Juran's rigid, meticulous style simply clashed with
Bron's more "fast and loose" approach.
16'For example, many problems with defective decision-making have nothing to do with
gathering information, but with processing (i.e., paying sufficient attention to) the information
at hand. See, e.g., JANIS, supra note 42, at 174-75 (describing "symptoms of defective decision-
making" due to "groupthink," such as "[f]ailure to examine risks of preferred choice," "[f]ailure
to reappraise initially rejected altematives," "[s]elective bias in processing information at hand,"
and "[fjailure to work out contingency plans").
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contradictory for scholars to argue that courts have enoilgh insight to recognize
their own tendency to be influenced by psychological factors but not enough to
detect the presence of these factors in others' decisions. It is possible for courts to
acknowledge the existence of psychological factors by a rule that, rather than
overly intruding upon the private ordering of a business decision, takes into
account more realistically how in practice people make these decisions.167
A related justification for the current judicial approach in merger and other
business decision-making is that people have done the best they can and,
therefore, it is unwise to tamper with the approach. As the argument goes,
managers, board members, and shareholders are always influenced by
psychological factors, but they attempt to resist some and incorporate others all
within a calculative rationality motivated by self-interest. 6 ' This rationality with
some psychological baggage, as developed over a long time, is the best available
decision-making system. It is not perfect, but it will eventually take care of
problems in a given business domain. Indeed, from an evolutionary perspective,
this outcome might well be a remnant of prehistoric times and may be a highly
effective manner of decision-making because it takes into account human
cognitive limitations.169 For example, it may well be extremely adaptive for
individuals to be optimistic, even over-optimistic, in business so as to be
emotionally able to overcome frequent setbacks, to face risks, and to be ready to
form cohesive groups that give them the support of a social network in difficult
times.170 This optimism with its cohesiveness may help decision-makers respond
quickly in business, especially in a time of industry shock brought about by
rapidly changing technology, and thus triumph over their competitors.
This justification, which is also highly influenced by the status quo bias, is
167 For an example of a proposed legal rule that takes into consideration psychological
issues, see Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 101, 157-63 (1997) (proposing that disclosure liability in a firm should not be limited to
knowledge by top officials because often their knowledge is not crucial to the disclosure
violation). See also James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom:
Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONT.
PROB. 83, 132-34 (1985) (in this classic study on psychological biases that make board
members sympathetic and partial to fellow board members, the authors discuss how this
sympathy can undermine the independent litigation committee approach to derivative suits
created under Delaware and other corporate laws; the authors propose to eliminate court
reliance on a director recommendation with respect to a suit against a fellow director and, as an
alternative, to have the special litigation committee appointed by a court); Fanto, supra note 10,
at 334-51 (arguing for a legal rule that would require the negative consequences of the merger
to be emphasized in board merger decision-making).
168Management literature attempts to improve this rationality so as to better board
performance. See Carpenter & Westphal, supra note 53, at 3-4.
169 See Langevoort, supra note 167, at 152-56; Posner, supra note 21, at 1561--64.
170See LANGEVOORT, HUMAN NATURE, supra note 50, at 13 (explaining that "highly
collegial groups create a better environment for productive work').
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really an indirect form of confidence in the "invisible hand" of the market.
171
From its perspective, the present form of business decision-making, as sanctioned
by the courts, is thought to be the lowest-cost way of making good decisions and
dealing with the psychological factors. Yet, once again, the justification raises
more questions than it provides answers. What if the current system of decision-
making is not the second best way of making decisions and accommodating
psychological factors?172 Because of the evidence of the persistence of value
destruction in mergers, and of the tendency of people either not to learn from their
mistakes in mergers or other business decisions or to learn slowly only after much
value destruction,' 73 can we really say that, at least with respect to this kind of
decision-making, we have arrived at a truly second best solution? Although any
legal reform must proceed cautiously so as to recognize the evolutionary adaptive
nature of, and not to upset, beneficial uses of quasi-rationality in business
decision-making, it would seem to be at the very least necessary, given the
empirical evidence on the psychological factors, to consider how to make courts
explicitly understand the complex psychological reality of this decision-making
when articulating legal standards governing it. This understanding, which would
be so different from the current simplistic judicial account of decision-making,
would likely result in changes to these standards.
B. Suggested Legal Responses to the Psychological Factors
The above reflection leads to the inquiry on the proper guidance to offer
courts and other legal policy-makers on a reform of the legal oversight of business
decisions that recognition of the presence and strength of psychological factors
requires. One problem is that most psychologically inspired work on legal
reforms of defective decision-making is in public law, which deals with situations
1 It thus is in agreement with the most prominent approach in business law scholarship.
For example, even some scholars who criticize current Delaware corporate law on takeovers do
so because it inappropriately constrains the working of the takeover market. See, e.g., RONALD
J. GuSON, UNOCAL FIFTrEEN YEARS LATER (AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT) 13-14, 22
(Columbia L. Sch. Center for L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 177, 2000), at
http://papers.ssm.comlsol3/papers.cfin (Aug. 1, 2000) (arguing that Unocal and its progeny
allows a target board to resist absolutely a tender offer, but not to preclude an election to replace
the board, and that the better outcome would be to allow target boards to negotiate with bidders
and then to let shareholders (i.e., the market) decide whether to accept the bid). This perspective
completely glosses over the presence of psychological factors in board or shareholder decision-
k See Jolls et al., supra note 21, at 1599-1600 (observing that the evolutionary argument
is highly speculative and not always provable).
173 See Langevoort, supra note 21, at 1521 (referring to business context where feedback
from bad decisions is not immediate and where people need to stress, despite setbacks,
optimism and control,); see also Carey, supra note 51, at 146 (providing remarks of Alex
Mandl, CEO of Telegent, that dismissed out of hand studies of merger failure).
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where emotions are seen to nullify a rational consideration of policy
alternatives.' 74 That world is seen as the opposite of the realm of business
decisions inhabited by hard-nosed, cost/benefit rationality and self-interested
capitalists focused on maximizing profits. The empirical results of this article,
however, suggest that this kind of rationality is not even the paradigm in the
business arena, and that psychological factors are inevitably intertwined with, and
are not secondary to, a decision that one could also characterize as rational. 175 An
effort to improve legal oversight of business decision-making might thus be
especially important, particularly if, because of the popular and scholarly
acceptance of the rationality paradigm in business, scholars are less vigilant about
the presence and influence of psychological factors in this kind of decision-
making and are all too ready to dismiss or to discount them heavily.
The refocusedinquiry, therefore, is to ask what legal reform is demanded by
the quasi-rationality of current business decision-making and, more specifically
for the purposes of this article, of mega-merger decision-making. At this stage, in
light of the insufficiency of empirical results establishing a clear correlation or
causation between specific psychological factors and poor merger decision-
making and given other promising research efforts, 176 it is advisable to tread
slowly and not rush precipitately to advocate specific legal reforms. It might make
more sense to establish the general goals of legal reform affecting merger
decision-making that are inspired by the psychological data and then to offer a
few concrete examples of possible specific legal changes. And these changes
could be in the two areas of law governing this decision-making--corporate law
and federal securities law. 1
77
As a general matter, one of the goals is relatively easy to articulate and has
already been suggested above: more understanding by courts and policy-makers
'
74 The best representative of this kind of work is Professor Cass Sumstein. See, e.g., CASS
R. SuNsTEIN, COGNmON AND COST-BENEFrr ANALYSIS (U. of Chicago John M. Olin L. &
Econ. Program, Working Paper No. 85, 1999), at http.//papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn (Oct.
14, 1999).
175 Courts may occasionally acknowledge the influence of emotions in decision-making,
but consider them as a secondary influence. See, e.g., Harbor Finance Partners v. Huizenga, 751
A.2d 879, 889 (Del. Ch. 1999) (discussing motivating factor of familial relations in decision-
making); HMG/Courtland Properties, Inc. v. Gray, 749 A.2d 94, 119 (Del. Ch. 1999) ("When
he does so [represent family members' interests], I have no doubt that Fieber attempts to protect
his family members' financial interests no less avidly than he attempts to protect his own.").
From a rational (and even genetic) perspective, of course, family interest may be no different
from self-interest. See PINKER, supra note 29, at 44 (claiming that the human goals of enjoying
health, life, sex, and family allow genes to survive across generations).
'
76 One related promising avenue of understanding and improving decision-making is
scholarship on the effects of norms. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 46, at 16 ('The more we learn
about norms, therefore, the more we should demand evidence of the comparative inadequacy of
these extralegal constraints on behavior before we impose additional, legal constraints.").
177The examples of possible legal reform provided below would thus be in addition to
those offered in Fanto, supra note 10, at 331-51.
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of the psychological complexity of decision-making. It is also not difficult to
imagine ways of implementing this goal, such as giving judges and others general
training in psychology (offered by an expert, such as Professor Rachlinski). A
second goal is just as easy to articulate-to regulate decision-making in order to
address the adverse effects arising from the psychological factors-but its
implementation is not as clear. As a general implementation framework for this
goal, it is helpful to use an approach proposed by two prominent scholars in the
law and psychology arena, Timur Kuran and Cass Sunstein. They propose that
decision-making should try to achieve a "comprehensive rationality" that is
designed to resist adverse effects of the psychological factors, particularly the
social "cascades" of adoption of a point of view that might flow from myopia;
biases, such as loss aversion or extremeness aversion; or heuristics, such as
anchoring.178 This kind of rationality would mean, among other things, having
decision-makers critically compare alternative plans of action before deciding
upon one, subject the selected course of action to considerable scrutiny for its
risks, and constantly re-evaluate the elected course for possible reasons to change
it.179 The framework would also involve strengthening the role of any available
science or discipline relevant to the decision-making. 80
Achievement of any "comprehensive rationality," moreover, must be done
with care, not with its own over-optimism, and with sensitivity to psychological
constraints and to the power of the psychological factors. Simply compelling
people to consider more information does not necessarily mean better decision-
making, especially in light of findings that further deliberation does not
necessarily make people reassess their viewpoints. It is also important not to
undermine the positive, adaptive aspects of psychological factors that help make
people productive. 82 The goal would be to enhance the behavior of a decision-
maker, like a board member, where he or she is already acting seriously and in
good faith.1
83
178 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 44, at 748.
179 This approach would echo proposals on resisting "groupthink" which suggest that a
policy should be arrived at only after much contentious debate and exposure to criticism of all
viewpoints. See JANIS, supra note 42, at 132-58, 260-71 (discussing resistance to groupthink in
Kennedy administration's dealing with the Cuban missile crisis).
ISOSee, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 174, at 9-19 (explaining how a cost/benefit analysis
can address problems arising from psychological factors).
181 See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 21, at 1094 (explaining that "people seem to use
more evidence to solidify their views, rather than to alter them").
"
82See LANGEvOORT, HUMAN NATURE, supra note 50, at 14; Rachlinski, supra note 164,
at 753 ("Finally, many of the psychological phenomena are quite adaptive. If these phenomena
are mental shortcuts that serve people well, or even enhance their well-being, then crafting legal
rules that induce people to avoid them could do more harm than good.").
183 See, e.g., Jonathan L. Johnson et al., Boards of Directors: A Review and Research
Agenda, 22 J. MGT. 409, 427 (1996) ("Perhaps the greatest support for the service role lies in
directors' self-reports that they devote a considerable proportion of their board-related time and
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Here it is useful to offer a few examples of how the law does not lead to, and
even undermines, comprehensive rationality and how it might be changed to
achieve this goal. The first example comes from both federal securities and state
corporate law. Many of the statements in the SEC documents that reveal the
presence of the psychological factors are, in securities law parlance, "forward-
looking" statements because they look towards, or forecast, the future. For
instance, firms' over-optimistic discussions of merger synergies or their
justification of a transaction as addressing potential changes in an industry and a
potential loss of competitive position (loss aversion), which appear, among other
places, in the "Reasons For the Merger" section of the document would fall into
this category. As noted earlier, the predictions are free of securities law liability so
long as they are accompanied by language cautioning a shareholder that the
foretold events or results may never occur.'8 4 Accordingly, it is standard practice
for a Form S-4 or Schedule 14A to include language in which the parties
preparing the disclosure documents claim legal protection for the forward-looking
statements."'5
effort to contributing to corporate decision making.").
'"See supra note 126 and accompanying text. Moreover, similar reasoning is used under
Delaware's corporate law duty of disclosure. If shareholders receive even boilerplate warnings
about the risks involved in the predictions, then boards satisfy their legal obligations. See
Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1130 (Del. Ch. 1999) ("Where clear and explicit
language has the incontrovertible effect of changing or modifying meaning, I cannot ignore that
meaning. This is true even if such qualifying language is routinely employed in disclosure
statements that tout potential benefits.").
'
85 The following example is typical:
This joint proxy statement-prospectus contains "forward-looking statements" within
the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These statements
may be made directly in this joint proxy statement-prospectus or they may be made a part
of this joint proxy statement-prospectus by appearing in other documents filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission by Chase and J.P. Morgan and incorporated by
reference in this joint proxy statement-prospectus. These statements may include
statements regarding the period following completion of the merger.
Words such as "anticipate," "estimate," "expect," "project," "intend," "plan,"
"believe," "target," "objective," "goal" and words and terms of similar substance used in
connection with any discussion of future operating or financial performance of Chase, J.P.
Morgan or J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. or the merger identify forward-looking statements.
All forward-looking statements are management's present expectations of future events
and are subject to a number of factors and uncertainties that could cause actual results to
differ materially from those described in the forward-looking statements. In addition to the
factors relating to the merger discussed under the caption "Risk Factors" above, the
following risks related to the businesses of Chase and J.P. Morgan, among others, could
cause actual results to differ materially from those described in the forward-looking
statements: the risk of adverse impacts from an economic downturn; increased
competition; unfavorable political or other developments in foreign markets; govemmental
or regulatory policies; market volatility in securities markets, interest or foreign exchange




Shareholders of the acquiring and target firms have natural, rational reasons
to want to know what their board members and CEOs think about the future
prospects of the mega-merger. And, as just described, the law encourages the
provision of this kind of information. However, it also-no doubt
unintentionally-allows corporate fiduciaries to make full use of the
psychological factors to influence shareholders' decision-making.' 86 Some
resistance to the psychological factors on the shareholders' part is stimulated by
the cautionary language and the required presentation of the transaction's risks in
the SEC documents. How influential can the psychological factors be on
shareholders if there are detailed warnings that a particular transaction may not
succeed or that it may not produce the intended effects?
However, the presentation of the negative may not be psychologically
effective when the use of the psychological factors enhances such a positive view
of the transaction. Because the positive has been so enhanced, both in the original
announcement of the transaction and in the Form S-4 or Schedule 14A,
shareholders will likely anchor to it and completely overlook or discount the
negative, as the board had done before them.187 Moreover, there may well be
qualitative differences in the psychological presentation of the positive and
negative. For one salient example, negative consequences of the transaction are
generally not quantified. For example, there is no prediction of the losses that
could arise from the transaction as the competitive position of the combined firm
erodes. Yet, without some highlighting of these losses or costs, the effect of the
psychological factors cannot be adequately reduced, and even this kind of
presentation may not alone be sufficient to counterbalance the factors' effects. It
We caution you not to place undue reliance on the forward-looking statements, which
speak only as of the date of this joint proxy statement-prospectus, in the case of forward-
looking statements contained in this joint proxy statement-prospectus, or the dates of the
documents incorporated by reference in this joint proxy statement-prospectus, in the case
of forward-looking statements made in those incorporated documents.
For additional information about factors that could cause actual results to differ
materially from those described in the forward-looking statements, please see the quarterly
reports on Form 10-Q and the annual reports on Form 10-K that Chase and J.P. Morgan
have filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission as described under "Where You
Can Find More Information."
WE EXPRESSLY QUALIFY IN THEIR ENTIRETY ALL FORWARD-
LOOKING STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTABLE TO EITHER OF US OR ANY PERSON
ACTING ON OUR BEHALF BY THE CAUTIONARY STATEMENTS CONTAINED
OR REFERRED TO IN THIS SECTION.
CHASE/J.P. MORGAN FORM S-4, supra note 79, at 19-20.6 Indeed, for a long time the SEC opposed the provision of forward-looking information,
which opposition it based upon the ever-present possibility of "puffing" by companies about
their future prospects. See generally JAMES D. Cox E7 AL., SECURMES REGULATION: CASES
AND MATERIALS 71-73 (2d ed. 1997). The SEC may have understood in a rough psychological
way that this kind of language inevitably highlights aspects of quasi-rationality over rationality.
18 7See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 21, at 1100-05.
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thus is psychologically inappropriate, because of their failure to promote or
achieve a comprehensive rationality, for federal securities law and state corporate
law to permit the psychological enhancement of the positive without imposing the
risk of liability merely because the positive presentation is "balanced" by a
presentation of the negative. 188
Furthermore, current law permits disclosure documents to be oriented
towards the positive and thus undermines the promotion of a comprehensive
rationality in the shareholders and among board members. It is well established
under federal securities law that corporate officers who seek shareholder approval
of a particular course of action are under no obligation to argue against the action
that they recommend or to present every potential negative consequence that
might arise from the transaction.189 Similarly, under the Delaware corporate law
duty of disclosure, a board does not have to include speculative or abandoned
possibilities other than the recommended course when requesting shareholder
action. 90 The board has only to make adequate disclosure about its proposal,
'
88E.g., In re Newell-Rubbermaid, No. 99-C-5853, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15190, at *26-
*30 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4,2000).
189See, e.g., Desaigoudar v. Meyercord, 223 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Section
14(a) and Rule 14a-9 do not obligate corporate officials to present, no matter how unlikely,
every conceivable argument against their own recommendations."). This kind of logic appears
throughout the SEC's rules promulgated under Section 14(a) and is founded on the basic
corporate law concept that board members, not shareholders, control the corporation. For
example, the board is under no obligation to accept from a shareholder a proposal that is
counter to one that it has proposed. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(9) (2001).
19 See, e.g., State of Wisconsin Investment v. Bartlett, No. 17727, slip op. at 28 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 24, 2000) ("The mere existence of unrequited attraction with other entities does not lead to
acceptance of plaintiff's assertion of materiality-namely that shareholders would then know
other deals might be possible and that there might be better options than the King merger
agreement."). See, for example, O'Reilly v. Transworld Healthcare, Inc:
Furthermore, while it is not necessary for the resolution of this motion, I note that it does
not appear that the duty of disclosure would obligate corporate fiduciaries to disclose
information regarding whether a merger represents the highest value available to a
corporation when the corporation has received, or its directors have obtained, only one
offer. While under certain circumstances a board's failure to obtain, through an auction of
the company, the most valuable offer available to the stockholders may constitute a
violation of their duties under Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., the duty of
disclosure does not appear to require them, when they have received only one offer, to
disclose information from which the stockholders could assess whether the offer represents
the highest value reasonably available to the company's stockholders, as opposed to
whether the offer at issue represents fair value.
745 A.2d 902, 929 (Del. Ch. 1999) (citing Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,
506 A.3d 173 (Del. 1986)); In re Lukens, Inc. Shareholders Litig., 757 A.2d 720,736 (Del. Ch.
1999) ("What the proxy statement does not do is explain why the board chose not to take
particular courses of action. Of course, requiring disclosure of every material event that
occurred and every decision not to pursue another option would make proxy statements so
voluminous that they would be practically useless.").
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which will enable shareholders to decide, on their own, whether or not to follow
this advice.19' Indeed, in presenting its recommendation that shareholders approve
a transaction like a merger, a board need not discuss in detail the transaction's
background, which might otherwise raise the issue of alternative and rejected
courses of action.
192
How can federal securities law and state corporate law change to increase
comprehensive rationality in merger decision-making without a radical
transformation in the law? As noted earlier, psychological research establishes
that a radical change is unlikely to be either proposed or accepted, for people are
rarely willing to undertake more than incremental changes in non-emergency
situations. With respect to federal securities law, the preferred approach, because
of its likely success, would be for the SEC to strengthen disclosure in a way that
would counter the influence of the psychological factors on shareholders and on
the board. To take one prominent example, throughout Form S-4s, the customary
boilerplate language found generally at the end of each section on a particular
board's "Reasons for the Merger" is that, after listing all the factors relevant to the
merger decision, there has been no attempt to identify which factor a particular
director thought to be important, and the board has not assigned a particular
weight to an enumerated factor in its decision-making.193 Yet under this approach,
a board member can hide behind a group decision, and the board itself is under no
obligation to give a detailed account of its decision-making and explain which of
the listed factors were most significant.
'9'See, e.g., In re G.M. Class H Shareholders Litig., 734 A.2d 611, 626 (Del. Ch. 1999)
(referring to choice of shareholders to accept or reject board's recommendation).
192 See, e.g., Matador Capital Mgmt. v. BRC Holdings, 729 A.2d 280,295 (Del. Ch. 1998)
('The application of [the disclosure] standard does not require a blow-by-blow description of
events leading up to the proposed transaction."); id at 297 ("Nor need [the disclosure
document] disclose the details of the board's discussions and deliberations."); Newman v.
Warren, 684 A.2d 1239, 1246 (Del. Ch. 1996) (no requirement of disclosure of views of
directors who opposed transaction). Again, DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2000)
extinguishes any claim for damages based on a violation of the duty of care as well as related
violations of the duty of disclosure, and a fully-informed shareholder vote approving a merger
may well extinguish most claims for a breach of fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Lukens, 757 A.2d at
732-35,737-38.
193 For example, in giving its reasons for AOL's merger with Time Warner, the AOL
board states:
This discussion of the information and factors considered by the America Online
board is not intended to be exhaustive, but includes the material factors considered. The
America Online board did not assign particular weight or rank to the factors it considered
in approving the merger. In considering the factors described above, individual members
of the America Online board may have given different weight to various ones. The
America Online board considered all these factors as a whole, and overall considered them
to be favorable to and to support its determination.
See AOrNM WARNER FORM S-4, supra note 92, at 33.
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One possible reform is for the SEC to require a company proposing a mega-
merger to disclose the board's assignment of a numerical weight and order of
importance to each of the enumerated reasons for and against the transaction.
194
This approach, which is not intended to suggest the correct weight to be given to a
specific reason or reasons a board should consider, is designed to stimulate a
comprehensive rationality on the board's part. This rationality would in turn be
conveyed to the shareholders and help produce a similar rationality in them. It
would thus not assume that rationality exists-or quasi-rationality can be
adequately addressed-simply because a board lists the information or factors
that it has considered in its decision-making and that shareholders should
understand to be important. 95 Instead, this approach assumes that the
psychological factors and the group momentum they create may be countered
only when a board member or shareholder is pulled out of the group framework
by being forced to consider critically a proposed transaction and confront negative
information about it.'
96
A complementary reform to the above SEC effort would involve a
reformulation of the "duty of disclosure" under Delaware corporate law, as
interpreted by the Delaware Chancery Courts. Under the fiduciary principles that
provide the basis for this duty, 197 a court might well hold that a board's disclosure
194 The SEC's intervention is justified here because the role of government would be to
affect a process that is socially disadvantageous (to stop the "cascade" of mergers). See CASS R.
SUNSTEIN & EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALr, SOLIDARITY IN CONSUMPTION 17-18 (U. of Chicago
John M. Olin L. & Econ. Program, Working Paper No. 98, 2000), at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin (May 3, 2000) (giving a broad definition of the "good"
to include practices and suggesting that when a practice becomes social, but is harmful, the
government can intervene to push society to reject the practice). The "market," as represented
by buyers or sellers as well as by private norm agents outside government who are currently
criticizing mega-mergers, may ultimately achieve the goal of addressing the psychological
factors, but for various reasons they are not succeeding now. See Fanto, supra note 10, at 295-
98.
195 Occasionally, a Form S-4 will achieve an approximation of this proposal. See, e.g.,
PFIZER/WARNER-LAMBERT FORM S-4, supra note 81, at 1-35-46 (weighing various reasons for
and against the merger). This presentation may be due to the fact that the merger came from a
contested bidding situation and spawned shareholders' lawsuits.
196 Board discussions about the proper ordering and consideration of factors arguing for
and against a merger may also stimulate more board critical analysis of the transaction. Other
improvements to disclosure, which would affect board and shareholder behavior, are
imaginable. The SEC could require a detailed cost-based analysis of the negative consequences
potentially arising from the merger. Naturally, the SEC would have to be careful in its enhanced
disclosure not to undermine board solidarity and thus harm well-functioning, cohesive boards.
See LANGEVOORT, HUMAN NATURE, supra note 50, at 30 ("When the law becomes too
aggressive, it risks altering the social dynamic of the board in a way that makes it less effective
as a working group."). It might do this by placing less emphasis on the factors influencing
individual board members (unless they were relevant) and more emphasis on a quantified
presentation of all factors material for the entire board.
'
97See O'Reilly v. Transworld Healthcare, Inc., 745 A.2d 902, 925 (Del. Ch. 1999)
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to shareholders on a proposed transaction must be appropriately balanced. To
fulfill the duty, the board should not offer one-sided, unfocused advocacy of its
desired course of action, but it must explain in detail, and in their order of
importance, the arguments against its position and its specific reasons for
rejecting them. Again, this legal reform would be more legally significant-and
thus more difficult to achieve-than the SEC's enhanced disclosure since it
would run counter to accepted court interpretation of this duty that directors need
not argue against their recommended course of action.198
Another possible disclosure reform designed to further comprehensive
rationality in decision-making would involve the fairness opinions of investment
bankers. As explained earlier, a board of directors of a company involved in a
merger, particularly the target company, almost always seeks an opinion from an
investment banking firm on whether the exchange ratio is "fair" to the company's
shareholders. 199 Indeed, investment bankers are sometimes critical for the
instigation and design of a particular transaction.20 0 Yet in the typical investment
banking opinion, investment bankers give their opinion in artistic, not scientific,
terms. They suggest, for example, that no deal is similar to another and, as in a
board's summary of its reasons for a merger, they make no effort to identify the
factors in order of importance that influenced their opinion. °1 Certainly, this
("Stockholders should be entitled to rely on the truthfulness of statements in communications
from corporate fiduciaries without having to question each representation against potentially
conflicting statements or facts that would lead to conflicting conclusions.").
19'Yet there is certainly language in Delaware court decisions that could be read to
support the proposal. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 12 (Del. 1998) ("Directors are
required to provide shareholders with all information that is material to the action being
requested and to provide a balanced, truthful account of all matters disclosed in the
communications with shareholders.") (emphasis added). From a procedural perspective,
moreover, the proposal is workable since, upon a plaintiff's motion for an injunction against a
transaction proceeding with faulty disclosure, a court could mandate that the disclosure be
revised. See, ag., Matador Capital Mgmt. v. BRC Holdings, 729 A.2d 280, 296-97 (Del. Ch.
1998) (ordering target company to revise Schedule 14D-9 to reflect actual board deliberations,
actions, and reasons regarding their support of a tender offer).
199See supra note 128 and accompanying text.2
°0A good example is the story of the role of the investment bankers in the
Daimler/Chrysler merger, as recounted in VLASIc & STERTZ, supra note 54, at 53 (role of the
Deutsche Bank); id at 78 (role of Bank of America); id. at 212-14 (role of First Boston).
201A typical example is that offered by Chase Securities, which provided a fairness
opinion to Chase in its merger with J.P. Morgan:
The preparation of a fairness opinion is a complex process and involves various
judgments and determinations as to the most appropriate and relevant assumptions and
financial analyses and the application of these methods to the particular circumstances
involved. Such an opinion is therefore not readily susceptible to partial analysis or
summary description and taking portions of the analyses set out above, without
considering the analyses as a whole, would, in the opinion of Chase Securities, create an
incomplete and misleading picture of the processes underlying the analyses considered in
rendering Chase Securities' opinion. Chase Securities did not form an opinion as to
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language is designed to deflect liability if the transaction turns out badly by
having the bankers remain somewhat vague about the sources of their opinion. As
a result, they cannot later be accused of overemphasizing one factor and missing
another. And the opinions, which are attached as exhibits to the Form S-4, are
detailed in their analyses. However, the vagueness of the statements in the
opinions does nothing to counter the psychological factors, which, as seen in the
case of anchoring, it actually promotes.
The SEC might consider a disclosure rule that would hold investment
bankers to a higher standard in their opinions by requiring them to consider the
potential negative consequences and costs arising from the transaction and to
quantify the likely negative results of the merger. In the same vein, investment
bankers could be required to give an opinion that explicitly addresses the
rationality of the deal from both the acquirer's and target's perspective as opposed
to their current limited focus on the fairness of the exchange ratio. After all, since
they are so involved in promoting the mega-mergers, it is appropriate for them to
be enlisted in the effort to achieve a comprehensive rationality on the part of
boards and shareholders. In addition, by expanding their opinions to address the
evidence on the negative results of mega-mergers, investment bankers would
enhance the comprehensive rationality of merger decision-making. They would
also present a stronger scientific rationale than that contained in the watered-
down, self-interested version of financial economics currently used to justify their
fairness opinions.20
The most important reform proposal would have to address the present
deferential attitude of the courts to merger decision-making when they apply
corporate law and their equity jurisprudence. This application does little to
counter the effects of the psychological factors.203 As discussed above, courts
whether any individual analysis, considered in isolation, supported or failed to support
Chase Securities' opinion. In arriving at its opinion, Chase Securities considered the results
of all such analyses and did not assign specific weights to particular analyses. The analyses
performed by Chase Securities, particularly those based on forecasts, are not necessarily
indicative of actual values or actual future results, which may be significantly more or less
favorable than suggested by such analyses. Such analyses were prepared solely as part of
Chase Securities' analysis of the fairness, from a financial point of view, to Chase's
stockholders of the exchange ratio in the merger. The foregoing summary is qualified in its
entirety by reference to the full text of Chase Securities' opinion.
CHASE/J.P. MORGAN FORM S-4, supra note 79, at 36.202 Cf Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 44, at 748 (discussing the need for a scientific
approach to counter psychological influences). See generally WLLIAM MEADOW & CASS R.
SUNsTEIN, STATIsTIcs, NOT EXPERTS (U. of Chicago John M. Olin L. & Econ. Program,
Working Paper No. 109, 2000) (unpublished manuscript), at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/paper.cfm (Dec. 8, 2000) (arguing for a reliance upon statistical
data, rather than expert opinions, since these opinions tend to be affected by over-optimism).
203 This is related to the issue of the design of the best board of directors, a goal that is
difficult to reach given the difficulty of doing empirical research on what makes a board
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generally defer to board decisions and intrude little in board decision-making,
other than to ensure that boards have appropriately gathered information,204 and
the deferential approach helps explain the psychological one-sidedness of a
typical Form S-4. Even under enhanced judicial scrutiny-which is not involved
in most mega-mergers-a court simply reviews whether a board's decision is
reasonable within the range of alternatives, rather than asking whether the board
made the best decision.205 If, in its deferential review, a court happens to consider
momentarily the transaction, the outcome of its consideration is pre-ordained.
precisely because of the use of the psychological factors, particularly framing.
That is, expressing the merger with the help of the psychological factors
invariably makes the merger appear rational to the CEOs, the board, shareholders,
and even to the courts!
20 6
This reform would be difficult, for it runs counter to a longstanding status quo
of corporate law and to courts' interpretations of it and of their own equitable
powers. But the reform is not inconceivable. In an earlier article, I proposed
function well. See generally Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of
Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature
(June 15, 2000) (unpublished manuscript), at http'/papers.ssm.comsol3/papers.cfn (June 29,
2000) (discussing empirical results on boards from an economic and finance perspective).
20See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244,264 (Del. 2000). The court writes:
As for the plaintiffs' contention that the directors failed to exercise 'substantive due care,'
we should note that such a concept is foreign to the business judgment rule. Courts do not
measure, weigh or quantify directors' judgments. We do not even decide if they are
reasonable in this context. Due care in the decisionmaking context is process due care
only. Irrationality is the outer limit of the business judgment rule. Irrationality may be the
functional equivalent of the waste test or it may tend to show that the decision is not made
in good fNith, which is a key ingredient of the business judgment rule.
Id.; Ash v. McCall, No. 17132, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 144, at *26 (Del. Ch. 2000) ('To analyze
this claim under the waste standard confuses the due care standard with substantive due care-a
concept that is foreign to the business judgment rule. Due care in the decision-making context is
process due care-whether the board was reasonably informed of all material information
reasonably available at the time it made its decision."); McMillan v. InterCargo, 768 A.2d 492,
505 (Del. Ch. 2000) ("Whether it is wiser for a disinterested board to take a public approach to
selling a company versus a more discreet approach relying upon targeted marketing by an
investment bank is the sort of business strategy question Delaware courts ordinarily do not
answer.').205See Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 48 (Del. 1993)
(citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 955-56 (Del. 1985) ("[A] court
applying enhanced judicial scrutiny should be deciding whether the directors made a
reasonable decision, not a perfect decision. If a board selected one of several reasonable
altematives, a court should not second-guess that choice even though it might have decided
otherwise.... [C]ourts... will determine if the directors' decision was, on balance, within a
range ofreasonableness.').
206 See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 265 (the Delaware Supreme Court, while stating that it does
not evaluate the alternatives facing the Disney board regarding its president, in fact presents the
path chosen by the board as the most reasonable in the circumstances).
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adoption of an intermediate standard of judicial review of a board decision to
engage in a mega-merger and explained how the standard could be seen to be
consistent with current law.20 7 Under this standard, courts could encourage boards
to improve the process of merger decision-making by ensuring that boards were
aware of the psychological factors and adopted procedures to accommodate them
and resist psychological momentum. The earlier suggestion about a revised
judicial view of the duty of disclosure in a merger context would be another step
in corporate law reform consistent with this proposal.
The best corporate law reform, however, may simply be to allow courts to
become aware of the findings of psychological literature, which show them the
effects of psychological factors and the inadequacy of their own view of
rationality based solely upon information processing, and of the evidence of
negative merger outcomes. Certainly, at times courts have shown themselves to
be psychologically sensitive to business situations and able to conduct hard-nosed
evaluations of business strategies where they think judicial intervention is
justified.2°8 With an enhanced psychological understanding and with more
disclosure available about board decision-making, courts may develop their
jurisprudence on merger decisions in incremental and unexpected but important
ways. For example, they may begin to expand their understanding of what
constitutes an appropriate decision-making process for a board about to engage in
a mega-merger so that the process is not limited to information gathering but
requires the board to make a showing that it addressed psychological factors.
Similarly, courts could augment the extremely small category of "irrational"
decisions to include those where boards did nothing more than gather
information, cite reasons for the merger in no particular order of importance, and
fail to consider the influence of psychological factors on their decision-making.
From a psychological perspective, in the absence of numerous merger disasters
that would create a crisis mentality, courts will not likely change their review of
207 See Fanto, supra note 10, at 333-51.
208 On psychology, see Chesapeake Corp. and Sheffield, Inc. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 328
(Del. Ch. 2000) (pointing out that the substantive coercion argument regarding shareholders
may be overused: "Our law should also hesitate to ascribe rube-like qualities to stockholders. f
stockholders are presumed competent to buy stock in the first place, why are they not presumed
competent to decide when to sell in a tender offer after an adequate time for deliberation has
been afforded to them?"); id. at 97 ("There is always the possibility that subjectively well-
intentioned, but nevertheless interested directors, will subconsciously be motivated by the
profoundly negative effect a takeover could have on their personal bottom lines and careers.").
On evaluation of strategic alternatives (when there is a claim of self-interest), see Strassburger
v. Earley, 752 A.2d 557, 573-76 (Del. Ch. 2000) (critically reviewing and rejecting defendants'
assertion that alternatives to a self-interested shareholder buy-back were seriously considered);
HMG/Courtland Properties, Inc. v. Gray, 749 A2d 94, 116-18 (Del. Ch. 1999) (discussing
alternatives available to corporation regarding the sale of its properties when considering a




mergers overnight. Change will probably come only after judges become aware
of their own uncritical acceptance of the influence of the psychological factors.2 °9
VII. CONCLUSION
The empirical study of this article shows that psychological factors are
forcefully present in merger decision-making. This finding suggests that the
factors influence the outcome of the decision, even if the extent of this influence
is unclear and if the exact relationship between the factors and poorly performing
mega-mergers cannot be established from the study itself. The finding, however,
is important because merger decisions, more than many business decisions, are
used as the paradigm of decision-making by rational actors. By contrast, this
article's study reveals that basic impulses, biases, and mental shortcuts that
influence rational activity and transform it into quasi-rational behavior lie at the
very heart of this mental activity. Moreover, in light of the overwhelming
evidence available from this study and others that mergers in general decrease
value for shareholders, it is fair to assume that there is some relationship between
the psychological factors and the negative results of these transactions.
State corporate law and federal securities law, however, do not usually
acknowledge the presence of the psychological factors or the quasi-rational
framework in mega-merger decision-making. Rather, they presume that board
members and shareholders make rational decisions so long as they engage in
information processing and make no extremely bizarre decisions. Courts and the
SEC thus rarely intrude upon merger decisions, and this deference blinds them to
the quasi-rationality that is at work in the transactions.
On the basis of both its study and past studies in this ongoing research
project, this article argues that there is a need for a fundamental reconsideration of
how courts and securities regulators review mega-merger decision-making in
producing and applying corporate and securities laws. It offers several examples
of possible legal reform, which are designed to produce a comprehensive
rationality in the boardroom that will also benefit shareholders when they vote on
a transaction. With more detailed empirical research, the reform proposals should
make board members focus on negative consequences of the transaction and
should stimulate more debate in the board room. Board members will then be
more likely to address better the influence of specific psychological factors.
Moreover, much legal improvement may naturally result if those who make legal
decisions become more aware of the influences of psychological and behavioral
factors on merger decision-making.
2°gAn economic downturn or recession might spur this judicial analysis by bringing even
more rapidly to the foreground the inevitable negative results of mega-mergers. See, e.g., Deal-
making Done, ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 2001, at 71 (discussing trouble at Bank of America and
other banks formed from mega-mergers).
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APPENDIX A
PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES & MERGER DECISION-MAKING
1. Myopia (also known as "focus on the present"): People often focus on the
present to the exclusion of the future. They are impulsive and short term in nature.
This is not a cognitive problem, as much as it is an impulse or emotional issue.
Comment: In merger decision-making, this could be represented by the desire
to respond to a recent change in the industry that, although portrayed as important
or even "path-breaking," may be seen to be relatively unimportant when judged
from a long-term perspective. There is evidence that many mergers are "reactive"
in nature (e.g., a firm merges because its competitors have merged); mergers
could be "impulsive."
2. Bounded Rationality
a. Loss aversion: People are more displeased with losses than pleased with
gains. People become attached to what they have ("endowment effect"). They are-
very averse to a loss of the status quo. This is the realm of "prospect theory":
people are simply not rational in their preferences or in their calculations and they
do not act as rational economic actors. Another way of expressing this cognitive
issue is to call it a "bias" (see infra). It is a "status quo bias" or, put another way,
an attachment to things as they are.
Comment: A typical example of this in merger decision-making would be to
justify a merger as necessary to maintain a company's current position in the
industry (i.e., that if it does not do the transaction, it will not keep up with its
competitors and/or will not maintain its competitive position). Another example is
that if the firm is a leader in the industry, it must "do the merger" to maintain its
leadership position. This factor may explain why firms so often cling to the same
management and continued existence of headquarters. Firms are willing to take
risks to maintain the status quo.
b. Biases: These are ways of viewing the world that distort facts. These are
cognitive, as opposed to impulse, errors.
(1) Extremeness Aversion: People do not like extremes and tend to select the
"middle" strategy or outcome.
Comment: This bias is not immediately obvious in merger decision-making.
Yet it would be the case if the merger is presented as a balanced response to
events with the decision-making grid as follows: (1) first extreme, doing nothing;
(2) second extreme, doing other transactions or trying to develop capacity in a
particular product on one's own; and (3) the merger (the middle outcome).
(2) Over-optimism: People tend to be unrealistically optimistic about
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themselves and their own abilities.
Comment: This is the classic explanation for value-decreasing mergers and
will likely be evidenced throughout Form S-4s and other company statements
about the merger. Even a seemingly neutral assessment of the likely growth of the
two companies is usually highly colored by optimism (for example, the
observation that the firm will succeed after the merger if everything goes right).
(3) Hindsight Bias: People often feel that what happened is inevitable. They
feel that a past event is more predictable than in fact it was.
Comment: This may be a difficult bias to detect in merger decision-making,
which deals with predicting a future event, not re-predicting a past one. It is
usually exemplified when one is trying to blame someone for not foreseeing
certain consequences that, in retrospect, seem inevitable (e.g., "You should have
known that if you did this, you would cause this harm, because the harm actually
occurred."). Perhaps it might appear as a justification for a merger as follows:
earlier management should have seen the development of the industry in one
direction; they did not; and we, the current management, are trying to address past
failings.
(4) Status Quo Bias: See "Loss Aversion," supra.
c. Framing Effects: Peoples' preferences can be manipulated. For example,
people can be encouraged to select an outcome because it is framed to be the
middle choice (extremeness aversion) or a strategy because it is framed to be
designed to avoid a loss (loss aversion).
Comment: If we find certain biases or other psychological factors, such as
loss aversion, we should be able to point out how the proxy statements and Form
S-4s are creating them by framing; i.e., recognizing that the statements are written
in a particular way to elicit psychological reactions.
d. Heuristics: Ways of thinking that people use to simplify tasks, which can
sometimes produce poor results.
(1) Availability Heuristic: People think that something is more likely to
happen or is more likely to be a problem if they can call it readily to mind. This
also explains "herd behavior" as people find to be more likely what others are
talking about (the "availability cascade").
Comment: A simple example of this is the justification of a merger by
reference to a merger of competitors, to some industry shock, or to a regulatory
change. Generally, once a merger occurs in an industry, it is followed by
numerous other transactions. Industry analysts and investment bankers articulate
the need for other transactions based on a past transaction or some current event
(e.g., oil mergers were necessary because of the drop in the price of oil).
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(2) Anchoring- People make judgments based on an initial value or "anchor"
that may be arbitrarily chosen, such as a value from their personal lives or initial
impressions.
Comment: One example of anchoring in merger decision-making would be a
merger justified by a given prior transaction of a competitor. If a competitor does
a mega-merger at a given price, this becomes the anchor or measuring stick for
any ensuing transactions and the event by which later transactions are judged.
Alternatively, a merger may be justified or measured in relation to past
transactions by the acquirer.
(3) Case-based decisions: People are reluctant to do full cost/benefit analysis,
so they reason from past examples ("representativeness") and take small,
incremental, reversible steps.
Comment: This kind of bias may not be very common in mergers, for these
are large, irreversible transactions. The representative bias, however, may be
exhibited for the reasons stated under the other biases.
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APPENDIX B
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS FOR DAIMLER/CHRYSLER MERGER, 1998
1. Myopia (Impulses) (STRONG)
Explanation of Chrysler's reasons: "The likelihood that the automotive
industry will undergo significant consolidation, resulting in a smaller number of
larger companies surviving as effective global competitors.'
2. Bounded Rationality
a. Loss Aversion (status quo bias) (STRONG)
The Form F-4 noted that:
Messrs. Schrempp and Eaton believed industry consolidation was likely
because of industry overcapacity and the potential benefits of combining
automotive companies arising from joint product design, development and
manufacturing, combined purchasing, other economies of scale and brand
expansion and diversification. In discussing the possibility of a business
combination between Daimler-Benz and Chrysler, they considered it essential
that their respective companies play a leading role in this process of expected
industry consolidation and choose a partner with optimal strategic fit.2
Note that the non-employee portion of the board is roughly divided between
directors of former companies, and management is also shared .
This transaction is clearly presented as a "merger of equals," which itself
highlights the status quo bias: "Daimler/Chrysler AG shall have a corporate
governance structure reflecting that the Transactions contemplate a 'merger-of-
equals.' 4 This structure included shared supervisory and management boards,
shared integration committees, and use of both headquarters. This is even more
highlighted when the release later states that, as a result of the merger-of-equals,
"Chrysler's directors and senior management will be in a position to help bring
about the realization of the enhanced growth prospects and synergies expected
from the combination of the two companies, for the benefit of stockholders of
Daimler/Chrysler AG (including former stockholders of Chrysler)."5
b. Extremeness Aversion (STRONG)
1 DAIMIER/CHRYSLER AG, REGISTRATION STATEMENT ON FORM F-4 49 (1998).
2 Id. at 46.
'Id. at 16.
4id.
5 Id. at 50.
2001] 1405
OHIO STA TE LA WJOURTAL
One alternative is for each company to remain independent and pursue its
own strategy. But this is suggested to be an almost unthinkable extreme because
of industry consolidation, which will result "in a smaller number of larger
companies surviving as effective global competitors." A middle alternative is
"[t]he Chrysler Board's view that Daimler-Benz was the best partner for a
business combination with Chrysler. While each company was strong by itself,
the combined company would be stronger than either one individually, because of
the two companies' complementary strengths."6
This opportunity is presented as "unique": "The Chrysler Board believed that
a combination with Daimler-Benz represented a unique strategic opportunity for
Chrysler and its stockholders, who could continue to participate as stockholders in
the combined company.... Therefore, the Chrysler Board did not seek a
transaction with any other company.",
7
This approach is echoed by Daimler, which points out that "automobile
companies that consolidate currently are likely to enjoy the most attractive
prospects for materially enhancing their long-term competitive position."8 Note
that management has no incentive to talk about other merger partners, so as not to
give ideas to other parties. However, there is a mention of the ability to consider a
"Superior Proposal." The implication also is that other combinations would not
have "complementary strengths."
An interesting point on "extremeness" is that the combination is said to
reduce the risk of each company operating on its own: "The combination with
Chrysler will help reduce the risk associated with the dependency on the premium
segment of the automobile market by introducing brand diversity."9
c. Over-optimism (STRONG)
Over-optimism appears throughout the document. One example is Chrysler's
reasons for the merger: "The opportunities for significant synergies afforded by a
combination of Chrysler and Daimler-Benz-based not on plant closings or lay-
offs, but on such factors as shared technologies, distribution, purchasing and
know-how."' 0
Moreover, although the risks of the transaction are highlighted (e.g.,
synergies may not be realized), there is the simple statement that "[t]he Chrysler
Board believed that these potential risks and disadvantages were greatly
outweighed by the potential benefits anticipated from the Transactions."" On the
61d. at49.
7id.
8 Id. at 58.
9Id.
'




other hand, Daimler quantifies the short and long-term synergies. 12
d. Hindsight Bias (NOT PRESENT)
e. Framing Effects
See supra "Loss Aversion" or "Extremeness Aversion."
f. Availability Heuristic
See supra 'Myopia" (the focus on industry consolidation).
g. Anchoring (MIDDLE)
Refer to discussion of CSFB's fairness opinion for Chrysler in which CSFB
looks at other business combinations.13 The same could be said about Goldman
Sachs' opinion for Daimler.
14
h. Case-Based Decisions
Perhaps representativeness is present as in "anchoring" above.
'
2 d. at 58.
'3 Id. at 53, 56.
14 Id. at 60.
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